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Abstract
People have long been trading in a “monetary” way. This persistence
of monetary trading suggests that it might be an efficient trading mecha-
nism. We formalize this intuition in a random-matching, absence-of-double-
coincidence-of-wants environment. The record-keeping technology is operated
by an information-processing center which summarizes and updates individu-
als’ past trading behavior in a binary variable. A trading mechanism consists
of an updating rule and an individual trading behavior rule. To capture the
difficulties in collecting and processing information about others’ past behav-
ior, we assume that the center faces costs, both fixed and variable, to operate.
We show that (1) any non-autarkic equilibrium trading mechanism is, in terms
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of aggregate variables (such as consumption and frequency of trade), observa-
tionally equivalent to a monetary trading mechanism and (2) any non-autarkic
optimal equilibrium trading mechanism is a monetary trading mechanism.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E40; C73; D82.
1 Introduction
Throughout time the means of exchange have changed considerably. Many commodi-
ties have been used as media of exchange, including chocolate, shells, butter, salt,
and, of course, paper. Recent technological developments led to a substantial in-
crease of cash substitutes like electronic payments and credit cards in most developed
countries (e.g. Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (1996)). Despite all the technological
developments in payment systems, the nature of exchange in developed economies is
strikingly similar to what it has been before — each person has a balance, which rises
when he gives up goods, and falls when he acquires goods. The trading mechanism
is, in an informational sense, still a monetary one: All that has changed is that the
balance, which was once physical, has become virtual.
This persistence of monetary exchange is puzzling. Given the advances in record-
keeping and communication technology, it now seems feasible to design a trading
mechanism which conditions trading behavior in information that monetary exchange
ignores. By taking into account that information, such a trading mechanism has the
potential to be more efficient than a monetary one. In fact, Kandori (1992) and
Kocherlakota andWallace (1998) explicitly design a non-monetary trading mechanism
which is more efficient than a monetary trading mechanism whenever the record-
keeping technology is sufficiently developed.1 Why do not real-world trading systems
exploit these efficiency gains? Why do we observe monetary trading and not some
other trading arrangement?
In this paper, we provide an answer to these questions in a random-matching,
1While both of these papers assume random matching, the conclusion extends to the setting of
Lagos and Wright (2005) as shown by Aliprantis, Camera, and Puzzello (2007).
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absence-of-double-coincidence-of-wants setting analogous to that of Kiyotaki andWright
(1989) and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998). Our view is that monetary trading
would not have persisted if there is a more efficient trading mechanism; the contribu-
tion of this paper is to identify, in the setting on which most recent monetary models
are built, an economically meaningful constraint on trading mechanisms that renders
monetary trading as the most efficient trading mechanism amongst those that satisfy
it.
In short: Individuals in single-coincidence matches choose whether or not to trade
depending on the history of past behavior. Each individual’s history of past behavior
is summarized in a binary state variable (i.e. there is memory) which is updated
by an agent — the center.2 This is a costly activity, hence, the center needs to be
incentivized and this leads to the constraint on trading mechanisms that will imply our
optimality result for monetary trading. Thus, no wonder why we observe monetary
trading: It is the best that can realistically — with an incentive-feasible memory —
be achieved.
Our optimality result significantly differs from that of Kocherlakota and Wal-
lace (1998). In the latter, monetary trading is optimal only when there is no other
record-keeping device other than fiat money (i.e. a portable object). In contrast, in
our optimality result, incentive-feasible memory is available and, as in Kocherlakota
(1998), monetary trading is just one particular way of using memory. Despite the
wealth of alternatives, monetary trading turns out to be almost the only way of using
it (in the sense that any non-autarkic equilibrium is, on the aggregate, observationally
equivalent to monetary trading) and, more importantly, the best way of using it.
We now elaborate on the above short but vague answer to our questions. Each
individual’s allocation is a function of his and other individuals’ past trading behav-
ior and each individual has access to information on other individuals’ past trading
behavior. However, this information is not perfect. As a metaphor for the difficulties
individuals often experiment in processing and coordinating on information about
2In particular, monetary trading in our framework uses memory (e.g. electronic money), not fiat
or commodity money.
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others’ past behavior (e.g. Camera, Casari, and Bigoni (2013)), there is a center (e.g.
an agent not involved in trading) who summarizes individuals’ past trading behavior
in a binary variable and updates this variable.3 We then impose that the center faces
costs to update this variable.
Costs to update individuals’ past trading information can arise for several reasons.4
In general, it takes time and effort to do it, it may require setting up a communication
device to collect information and a software to process it. In the latter case, time
and effort may be required to write down the computer code and for the employees
of the center to learn it. For these reasons, we assume that the center faces costs,
both variable (e.g. dependent on the frequency by which changes need to be made)
and fixed (e.g. set-up costs), and that trading arrangements with more changes cost
more.5
A trading arrangement consists of an updating rule together with a form of indi-
vidual trading behavior (a behavior rule). Monetary trading is a particular trading
arrangement. But is it the best trading arrangement? Here best in the sense of
maximizing, within a relatively broad class of trading arrangements,6 a long-run (i.e.
steady-state) social welfare criterion in a decentralized way, namely, such that both
the center and the individuals are happy to follow its rules.
Incentives for the center are provided via payments from individuals that are con-
ditional on whether or not individuals’ past trading information is updated as specified
by a given trading arrangement. The presence of costs that differ across trading ar-
3The use of a binary variable to summarize individuals’ trading behavior is made for tractability
(as in e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998)) and is restrictive when
combined with additional constraints on the behavior of the center that we will impose. However,
in the absence of these or other constraints, it is not restrictive in the sense that it does not prevent
the first best allocation from being achieved.
4These costs can be substantial; see Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (2000).
5See (10)–(12) for the conditions we impose on costs. These conditions are satisfied, for example,
if costs equal, in every period, the frequency by which changes to individuals’ information are made,
to which we add, in the initial period, a measure of set-up costs.
6When production is binary (which we allow but do not impose), there are 240 =
1, 099, 511, 627, 776 possible trading arrangements in our setting; see Footnote 16.
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rangements means that not all trading arrangements are necessarily incentive-feasible
for the center because the center may be able to obtain the same payment while saving
on costs. In fact, we show that any non-autarkic equilibrium is, in terms of aggregate
quantities, observationally equivalent to monetary trading.7
A sharper result is obtained when we focus on optimal equilibrium. We specify
the optimum problem in such a way that the updating costs are, together with the
average well-being of the individual traders, considered in the social welfare ranking.8
Similarly to what has been described above, the presence of costs that differ across
trading arrangements means that not all equilibrium trading arrangements are nec-
essarily optimal because it may be possible to obtain the same average well-being of
the individual traders while saving on costs. Indeed, we show that, provided that
there exists a non-autarkic equilibrium ranked above autarky, monetary trading is
the unique optimum equilibrium.9
In conclusion, monetary trading is, in the sense of the above result, the optimal
trading arrangement. To the extend that the setting we consider is useful as a founda-
tion of monetary economics, this optimality of monetary trading helps to rationalize
the monetary nature of real-world trade.
We emphasize that what is crucial in our definition of monetary trading is a
specific form of updating individuals’ information and a specific form of individual
trading behavior. In particular, the way this information is recorded (e.g. whether it
uses a specific object or whether it is done electronically) is immaterial: According
to our result, monetary trading is the optimal equilibrium independently of how
individuals’ past behavior is recorded. Thus, monetary trading persisted while the
7These aggregate quantities include the fraction of single-coincidence matches in which there is
trade, the quantity traded in such case and, hence, total output and consumption.
8See (15) and (16) for the conditions we impose on the social welfare ranking.
9In particular, this result does not require “high” discount factors. This feature and the fact that
monetary trading is an (exact) optimum distinguishes our optimality result from the asymptotic (on
the discount factor and number of status levels) and approximate optimality results for monetary
trading of e.g. Berentsen (2002), Green and Zhou (2005), van der Schaar, Xu, and Zame (2013) and
Olszewski and Safronov (2018). See Section 5 for more on this point.
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means of exchange changed. Moreover, monetary trading will continue to persist as
long as costs to updating individuals’ past trading information remain in the form we
have specified.
An important implication of adding the center to the model for our optimality
result is that, in any equilibrium, there are no changes to the record of each individ-
ual’s information off-the-equilibrium path. The addition of the center to the model
can, therefore, be seen as a way of justifying this property: Changes to individuals’
information off-the-equilibrium path are never observed, hence the center can discard
them and save on fixed costs while obtaining the same payment.10 As Rubinstein
(1986) puts it, “social institutions, various types of organizations, and human abili-
ties degenerate or are readily discarded if they are not used regularly”.
One implication of the property that, in any equilibrium, there are no changes
to the record of each individual’s information off-the-equilibrium path is that the
non-monetary trading arrangement of Kandori (1992) and Kocherlakota and Wal-
lace (1998) is not an equilibrium. Indeed, these are gift-giving, grim-trigger trading
arrangements whose efficient outcome relies on the treat of autarky for anyone who
fails to produce, i.e. on a transition off-the-equilibrium path.11 Grim-trigger trading
arrangements, and strategies more generally, are very prominent and make sense (i.e.
are an equilibrium) in several settings, namely when individuals do not face difficulties
in updating other individuals’ past trading information, e.g. among married couples
or people in village economies.12 They do not in the present setting in light of the
above arguments.13
Our results are consistent with some experimental evidence. Bigoni, Camera, and
Casari (2014), Camera and Casari (2014) and Duffy and Puzzello (2014) observed
10These changes would still be discarded if they occur infrequently, e.g. if individuals tremble and
choose non-equilibrium actions. See Section 2.5.3 for a more detailed discussion.
11The same argument applies to a modification of the grim-trigger trading arrangement where no
production is part of the equilibrium path. See Footnote 17 for details.
12See Kocherlakota (1996) regarding the latter example.
13Note that eliminating grim-trigger trading arrangements from the equilibrium set is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for our optimality results as there are (many) trading arrangements that
differ from both monetary trading and grim-trigger (see Section 2.3 for some examples).
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that the most efficient outcome in their experiments occurred when subjects used
monetary trading. In addition, in the benchmark treatment in Bigoni, Camera, and
Casari (2014) and Camera and Casari (2014), there is evidence (see the discussion
following Result 5 in the former paper and Result 4 in the latter) that subjects
in some treatments tried to use a gift-giving, grim-trigger trading arrangement but
were reluctant to update or, at least, act on information on other individuals’ past
behavior when off-the-equilibrium path. While there is evidence that some producers
chose not to produce after observing no production by some other subject, this did
not occur frequently enough; in fact, those subjects who were frequent defectors
(i.e. those who produced in less than 20% of the matches where they were the
producer) were the ones who received the highest payoff (see Figure 4 in Bigoni,
Camera, and Casari (2014) and Figure 3 in Camera and Casari (2014)). Thus, as in
our result, difficulties in updating other individuals’ past trading information (leading,
specifically, to “little” updating of information off-the-equilibrium path) seemed to
justify the observed optimality of monetary trading in those experiments.
There may be other (possibly milder or more appealing) conditions leading to
an optimality result for monetary trading and also more complicated settings where
monetary trading will not be optimal under reasonable conditions. Determining the
exact scope of the optimality of monetary trading is beyond the goal of this paper;
instead, the goal of this paper is simply to provide an economically meaningful opti-
mality result for monetary trading in the classic framework of Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) that goes significantly beyond that of Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998).
Kocherlakota and Wallace’s (1998) optimality result for monetary trading assumes
that there is no information on other individuals’ past trading behavior (i.e. no mem-
ory) other than what is transmitted by a portable object (fiat money). In contrast,
we have an imperfect but still sufficiently rich memory that allow us, in particular, to
dispense with the presence of a portable object. There is no special role given to fiat
money so that, in our monetary trading arrangement, an individual’s money balance
is simply a label or a status level. As a result, Kocherlakota and Wallace’s (1998)
no-commitment condition, requiring no change to an individual’s balance when he
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chooses not to produce, and which is key to their optimality result, is not imposed.
Instead, our optimality result relies on the properties we impose on updating costs,
namely, that less changes to individuals’ past trading information imply lower costs
and that lower costs imply higher social welfare.
To see our main result in perspective, note first that Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)
specified a setting where monetary trading is an equilibrium. In their setting, mon-
etary trading uses commodity money or fiat money, the latter then implying that
individuals are willing to accept an intrinsically worthless object in exchange for valu-
able goods. Kocherlakota (1998) then showed that the important feature of money
in monetary trading is to serve as a record-keeping device, i.e. memory. In this line
of thought, Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) then showed that monetary trading is
optimal when individuals have no access to records of past behavior other than what
is provided by fiat money. Our main result now show that for monetary trading to
be optimal, memory does not need to be nonexistent: If memory is incentive-feasible
and designed optimally to reduce costs, then monetary trading is the optimal trading
arrangement.
Kocherlakota’s (1998) money-is-memory result lead researchers to look for essen-
tiality results for monetary trading, i.e. for settings where some (optimal) allocations
can be supported with money but not with memory (see Huggett and Krasa (1996)
and also Araujo, Camargo, Minetti, and Puzzello (2012) for a recent result). This
paper offers a different response to Kocherlakota’s (1998) result by presenting a set-
ting where the incentive-feasible form of memory we consider is, at least for optimal
equilibrium allocations, equivalent to money. In this sense, incentive-feasible memory
is money and, in such setting, there is no reason why people should not use money.
There are some qualifications for our loosely stated results, their details being
presented in what follows. Section 2 presents the model, including the notion of
monetary trading and the specific details regarding the center. Our main results
appear in Section 3. Section 4 discusses some of our assumptions and Section 5
presents additional concluding remarks and a discussion of more recent developments
in the literature. The proofs of our results are in the Appendix.
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2 The model
2.1 The environment
The environment is analogous to that of Kocherlakota andWallace (1998) and consists
of a random-matching, absence-of-double-coincidence-of-wants setting along the lines
of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There
are N ≥ 3 distinct perishable goods at each date and there is a [0, 1] continuum of
each of N types of people. Each type is specialized in consumption and production:
A type n person consumes good n and produces good n+1 (modulo N). Each person
maximizes expected discounted utility with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
In each period, each person can produce a quantity on a set Y ⊆ R+. We assume
that 0 ∈ Y and that Y has at least two elements. Two particular examples (which
we do not impose) are: The indivisible goods case where Y = {0, 1} and the divisible
goods case where Y = [0, y¯] for some y¯ > 0. In each period, the utility of producing
y ∈ Y equals −y and the utility for a type n person of consuming y units of good n
equals u(y), where u : R+ → R+ is strictly increasing with u(0) = 0.
The type of each individual is perfectly observable by all individuals. In each
period, there is also public information on the actions taken by each individual prior
to the current period. Following Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), the infor-
mation on each individual’s history of past actions is summarized by a finite-valued
state variable called status. We do not assume that the status level is tangible; an
individual’s status level is simply an abstract record of his past history. However, in
some specific trading mechanisms, the status level can have a concrete interpretation
and, in the particular case of the monetary trading mechanism defined in Section 2.3,
the status of an individual can be interpreted as his (electronic or paper) money hold-
ings; we emphasize that, despite this interpretation, we do not assume the existence
of a portable object. In this paper, for tractability, we focus on binary status levels.
In each period, people are randomly matched in pairs. This matching is such
that, for each person, the distribution of partners’ type and status from which an
individual’s meeting is drawn matches the demographic distribution of types and
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status in the entire population of the economy. Each person in a meeting knows his
trading partner’s type and status.
2.2 Trading mechanisms
Trade between individuals in the economy is described by a trading mechanism. We
focus on trading mechanisms that are symmetric across individuals (i.e. that treat
equally all individuals of the same type), pure (i.e. do not involve randomization) and
binary (i.e. that have at most two status levels).14 Such mechanisms are described
as follows. In each period, each individual has a status level of 0 or 1. In no-
coincidence meetings, the mechanism recommends no production (and, therefore, no
consumption) and unchanged status. In single-coincidence meetings, as a function of
each individual’s status, the producer decides how much to produce and the consumer
decides whether or not to accept the quantity produced by the producer (a strictly
positive production implicitly means that the producer accepts to give the quantity
he has produced to the consumer).15 These actions, together with both individuals’
status levels, determine each individual’s next period status level.
Let S = {0, 1} be the set of status levels and let
X = S2 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
denote the set of status profiles. Let A = Y × {0, 1} denote the set of action pro-
files, where (y, 1) (resp. (y, 0)) means that the producer offers to produce y and the
consumer accepts (resp. does not accept) the quantity proposed by the producer.
Formally, a trading mechanism pi is defined by a decision function B : X → A and a
transition function T : X × A → X. Throughout the paper, for each status profile
and each action profile, the first coordinate refers to the producer while the second
to the consumer, i.e. x = (xp, xc) and a = (ap, ac). Thus, the first coordinate of the
14See Section 4 for a discussion of these assumptions.
15In a single-coincidence meeting, by definition, there is one, and only one, individual who derives
utility from the consumption of the good produced by the other; the former is referred to as the
consumer and the latter as the producer.
10
behavior and the transition functions refers to the producer in the match while the
second refers to the consumer and we often write B = (Bp, Bc) and T = (Tp, Tc). The
interpretation of the function B is that Bi(x) describes i’s choice, where i = p, c, in a
single-coincidence meeting when the producer and the consumer have status profile
x ∈ X. For each x ∈ X, the quantity produced and consumed (henceforth, traded)
equals
y(x) = Bp(x)Bc(x),
i.e. y(x) = Bp(x) if Bc(x) = 1 and y(x) = 0 if Bc(x) = 0; thus, as in Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989), there is trade if and only if both parties agree. For each (x, a) ∈ X×A
and i = p, c, Ti(x, a) is i’s next period status level when the current status profile is
x and the current action profile is a.16
We note that there are no feasibility constraints on B and T (latter on, B and
T will be constrained by equilibrium conditions). This is because status levels are
abstract records of the past. In contrast, if each status level was the quantity of a
portable object, then some feasibility constraints would be natural. For instance, it
would be natural to impose that Tp(x, a) + Tc(x, a) = xp + xc for each x ∈ X and
a ∈ A to express the requirement that individuals leave a single-coincidence match
with the same total quantity of the portable object that they have entered. We do
not impose any such constraint (see Footnote 32 for more on this).
Actual trade in the economy depends on the trading mechanism pi being used and
on the distribution of status levels in the economy. We focus on status distributions
that are symmetric across types; thus, a status distribution is described by an element
of ∆ = {(q0, q1) ∈ R2+ : q0 + q1 = 1}, where qs is the fraction of people of each type
having status s, for each s ∈ S = {0, 1}.
We focus on stationary distributions of the Markov chain on S that pi (together
with the specification of the economy) induces when individuals follow it. Such sta-
tionary distributions are defined as follows. For convenience, in the case where indi-
16In the indivisible goods case, there are 44 = 28 possible B-functions, 216 possible Tp-functions
and 216 possible Tc-functions, hence, 2
40 possible trading mechanisms.
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viduals follow pi, we simplify the notation by defining, for each x ∈ X,
T (x) = T (x,B(x)).
Then q is a stationary distribution of the Markov chain on S induced by pi if q1 = 1−q0
and
q0 = q0

∑
s:Tp(0,s)=0
qs
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
producer
+
∑
s:Tc(s,0)=0
qs
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer
+
N − 2
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
no-coincidence
+q1

∑
s:Tp(1,s)=0
qs
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
producer
+
∑
s:Tc(s,1)=0
qs
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer
 .
(1)
Following Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), we refer to a pair µ = (pi, q) as
a trading norm when pi is a trading mechanism and q ∈ ∆. We say that a trading
norm µ = (pi, q) is stationary if q is a stationary distribution of the Markov chain on
S induced by pi.
2.3 Monetary trading norms and other examples
In a monetary trading mechanism, when possible, the producer produces and receives
money, while the consumer gives money and receives the consumption good. Formally,
we say that pi is a monetary trading mechanism if, for some 0 < y < u(y),
Bp(x) =
y if x = (0, 1),0 otherwise, (2)
Bc(0, 1) = 1, and (3)
T (x, a) =
(1, 0) if x = (0, 1) and a = (y, 1),x otherwise (4)
for all x ∈ X and a ∈ A. We then say that µ = (pi, q) is a monetary trading norm if
0 < q0 < 1 and pi is a monetary trading mechanism.
The interpretation is clear: In a monetary trading norm, the status of an individual
is interpreted as his money holdings. Moreover, a strictly positive quantity is traded
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if and only if the producer has zero units of money and the consumer has one unit
of money. In this case, the producer receives one unit of money from the consumer.
In the remaining cases, there is no trade and no transfers of money. These cases can
be interpreted as follows: When the money holdings are x = (0, 0) or x = (1, 0),
the consumer has no money to pay for the good; and when x = (1, 1), the producer
cannot receive more money because there is effectively an unit upper bound on money
holdings. Furthermore, 0 < q0 < 1 means that trade actually takes place with a
strictly positive probability (equal to q0(1− q0)/N).
In the above definition, the actual monetary trading norm depends on q0, y,
Bc(0, 0), Bc(1, 0) and Bc(1, 1). The set of all monetary trading norms is denoted by
M .
A prominent trading norm, used in Kandori (1992) and Kocherlakota and Wallace
(1998) to obtain a more efficient trading norm than monetary trading, is the grim-
trigger norm. Formally, we define the grim-trigger trading norm µG = (piG, qG) by
setting qG1 = 1,
BG(x) =
(y, 1) if x = (1, 1),(0, 0) otherwise, and
TG(x, a) =
(0, 1) if x = (1, 1) and ap ̸= y,x otherwise
for all x ∈ X and a ∈ A, where y ∈ Y is such that u(y) > y. Here, a status of 1
indicates that the individual has produced in all the past single-coincidence meetings
in which he was the producer. Production occurs if and only if the two individuals
in a single-coincidence meeting have status of 1; thus, someone who fails to produce
in some of the past single-coincidence meetings in which he was the producer will
be in autarky from that time onwards. To see that this norm is more efficient than
then monetary trading norm with the same level of production, simply note that
y is produced and consumed in every match under grim-trigger; in contrast, under
monetary trading, there is zero production and consumption in all single-coincidence
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matches where the status profile is (0, 0), (1, 0) and (1, 1).17
Despite the prominence of the grim-trigger trading norm, our goal is to compare
monetary trading norms with all possible trading norms and not just to the grim-
trigger. As an example of a non-monetary trading norm which is also different from
the grim-trigger norm, consider the following monetary trading norm with charity
µC = (piC , qC) defined by setting
BC(x) =

(y, 1) if x = (0, 1),
(y′, 1) if x = (0, 0),
(0, 0) otherwise, and
TC(x, a) =

(1, 0) if x = (0, 1) and a = (y, 1),
(1, 0) if x = (0, 0) and a = (y′, 1),
x otherwise
for each x ∈ X and a ∈ A, where qC ∈ ∆ and y, y′ ∈ Y are such that 0 < y′ < y.
This trading mechanism differs from monetary trading in that producers produce to
a consumer with zero status (although a quantity lower than the one they produce
for a consumer with a status of one) and are rewarded by attaining a status of one.
Thus, an individual’s status reflects both past accumulation of money and past good
behavior.
For the above monetary trading norm with charity to be stationary requires qC1 =
1. This, together with yC(1, 1) = Bcp(1, 1)B
C
c (1, 1) = 0, means that trade occurs with
probability zero. To give an example of a non-monetary and non-grim-trigger trading
mechanism in which trade occurs with strictly positive probability, we modify the
monetary trading norm with charity as follows. Define the monetary trading norm
17 By setting qG1 to be less than 1 (but still above 0), we obtain a grim-trigger-like trading norm
where zero production occurs in some matches on the equilibrium path.
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with charity and a vow of poverty µP = (piP , qP ) by setting qP0 = 1/2, B
P = BC and
T P (x, a) =

(1, 0) if x = (0, 1) and a = (y, 1),
(1, 0) if x = (0, 0) and a = (y′, 1),
(1, 0) if x = (1, 1) and a = (0, 0),
x otherwise
for each x ∈ X and a ∈ A. Thus, besides the difference between qC and qP , the
difference between this trading norm and the monetary trading norm with charity
is that, in single-coincidence matches with status profile x = (1, 1), the consumer
becomes poorer, in the sense of transiting from the high-valued status of 1 to low-
valued status of 0 without receiving any material compensation for that.
A final example is obtained by combining the decision function of monetary trading
mechanisms with a variation of the transition function of the grim-trigger. Formally,
we define the grim-monetary trading norm µGM = (piGM , qGM) by setting qGM1 = 1/2,
BGM(x) =
(y, 1) if x = (0, 1),(0, 0) otherwise, and
TGM(x, a) =

(0, 1) if x = (1, 1) and ap ̸= y,
(1, 1) if x = (0, 1) and ap = y,
x otherwise
for all x ∈ X and a ∈ A, where 0 < y < u(y). Thus, as in a monetary trading norm,
qGM1 ∈ (0, 1) and trade takes place if and only if the producer in a single-coincidence
meeting has status 0 and the consumer has status 1. As in the grim-trigger trading
norm, a status of 1 (resp. 0) can be interpreted as indicating good (resp. bad) past
behavior. Furthermore, a producer loses his good status when he fails to produce for
a consumer with good status (despite following the recommendation of the decision
function BGM). However, unlike the grim-trigger trading norm, there is in TGM an
element of forgiveness: A producer with bad status who produces for a consumer with
good status regains his good status.
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2.4 Equilibrium and the optimum problem
In this section we preview our notions of an equilibrium and of an optimal equilibrium,
and apply them to the setting of Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998).
Given a stationary trading norm µ = (pi, q), the utility each individual receives
is described by a function V (µ) : S → R, which we often write simply as V when
it is clear what the trading norm is. Specifically, for each s ∈ S = {0, 1}, V (µ)(s)
(which we write as Vs(µ) or, simply, as Vs) gives the expected discounted utility of
an individual having status s. The function V satisfies
V0 =
q0
[−(1− β)y(0, 0) + βVTp(0,0)]+ q1 [−(1− β)y(0, 1) + βVTp(0,1)]
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
producer
+
(N − 2)βV0
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
no-coincidence
+
q0
[
(1− β)u(y(0, 0)) + βVTc(0,0)
]
+ q1
[
(1− β)u(y(1, 0)) + βVTc(1,0)
]
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer
(5)
and
V1 =
q0
[−(1− β)y(1, 0) + βVTp(1,0)]+ q1 [−(1− β)y(1, 1) + βVTp(1,1)]
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
producer
+
(N − 2)βV1
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
no-coincidence
+
q0
[
(1− β)u(y(0, 1)) + βVTc(0,1)
]
+ q1
[
(1− β)u(y(1, 1)) + βVTc(1,1)
]
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumer
.
(6)
The function V above allows us to verify whether or not individuals have an in-
centive to follow the actions prescribed by pi. We require that each individual in a
single-coincidence meeting cannot increase his utility through an one-shot deviation.
Specifically, we require that the producer does not gain by choosing a quantity dif-
ferent from Bp(x) and that the consumer does not gain by changing his acceptance
decision: For each x ∈ X, y′ ∈ Y and α ∈ {0, 1},
−(1− β)y(x) + βVTp(x) ≥ −(1− β)y′Bc(x) + βVTp(x,(y′,Bc(x))) (7)
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and
(1− β)u(y(x)) + βVTc(x) ≥ (1− β)u(αBp(x)) + βVTc(x,(Bp(x),α)). (8)
The information on each individual’s trading history, i.e. each individual’s status,
is updated by a center. Formally, the center is an agent different from the individuals
engaged in trading and which is himself not involved in trading. As we describe
explicitly in Section 2.5, the center faces costs to operate and, hence, it may or
may not have an incentive to update individuals’ status levels according to a given
transition function T . Informally, we say that a stationary norm µ = (B, T, q) is an
equilibrium if the center has an incentive to follow T and the individuals have an
incentive to follow B, the latter being characterized by (7) and (8). We use E to
denote the set of equilibria.
An important particular case is obtained when the center faces no costs to operate.
In this case, the center is a priori indifferent between any two transition functions as
all of them cost the same to operate (i.e. zero); hence, it is easy to incentivize the
center to follow any given transition function. In this case, an equilibrium is simply
a stationary norm µ such that (7) and (8) hold.18
We consider an optimum problem which is analogous to the one in Kocherlakota
and Wallace (1998) and with a similar interpretation. Its goal is to choose an equilib-
rium that is a best element according to a social ranking of stationary trading norms.
Let ≻ denote the (strict) social ranking of stationary trading norms. An optimal
equilibrium is then µ∗ ∈ E such that there is no µ ∈ E such that µ ≻ µ∗.
In our setting, the social ranking of stationary trading norms treats individuals in
a symmetric way and, moreover, depends both on the costs of operating the center
and on the average expected discounted utility. The latter is the weighted average
of the expected discounted utility of those individuals with status level equal to one
and zero, with weights given by the proportions of each of these two groups in the
population. Thus, the average expected discounted utility of a stationary trading
norm µ is W (µ) = q0V0(µ) + q1V1(µ). By combining (1), (5) and (6), it is easy to see
18In this case, the equilibrium notion we use is analogous to the concept of Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite’s (1995) norm equilibrium.
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that
W (µ) =
1∑
s=0
1∑
s′=0
qsqs′
u(y(s, s′))− y(s, s′)
N
. (9)
In the particular case where the center faces no costs to operate, it is natural to
consider the social ranking of stationary trading norms given by the average expected
discounted utility, i.e. µ ≻ µ′ if and only if W (µ) > W (µ′). This case corresponds
to the “memory” case in Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) (i.e. to the case where, in
their setting, the record of individuals’ past actions is updated in every period with
probability one) and it follows by their Proposition 3 that monetary trading is not
an optimal equilibrium. We shall see below how the presence of costs to operate the
center can make monetary trading be an optimal equilibrium.
2.5 The center
The social planner chooses a stationary norm µ = (pi, q) to maximize the social
ranking of stationary norms (described later) in a decentralized way. The latter means
that each individual chooses his actions to maximize his own expected discounted
utility; in particular, µ must be such that each individual is happy to follow the
decision function B.
The decentralization of µ also requires someone to perform the task of updating
status levels; while the social planner could, in principle, perform it, this task is
delegated for standard reasons (e.g. lack of time, comparative advantage, etc.). The
person to whom this task is delegated is called the center. To separate the role
of different people, the center is an agent different from the individuals engaged in
trading and which is himself not involved in trading. His role is to update individuals’
status levels and he will choose to do so to maximize his payoff; thus, µ must also be
such that the center is happy to follow the transition function T .
The center faces costs and receives payments from the remaining individuals. In
what follows, we describe the costs that the center faces and the payments he receives
from the rest of the individuals. We then describe the interaction between the center
and the individuals, and the role that the social planner plays in that interaction.
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Finally, we specify the notion of equilibrium that we use and the social ranking of
stationary norms that defines the optimum problem that we consider.
2.5.1 Costs
Costs to operate the center may arise for several reasons. For instance, some com-
munication device must be used for the center to know what has happened in every
single-coincidence meeting. Such communication device must be installed and some
time must be devoted to use it. Furthermore, it might be that the costs arise not
just from the time involved in processing changes to individuals’ status levels but also
from how complex the procedure used to process them is, e.g. how difficult it is to
write the computer program used for this task, or how much computational power is
needed, or how much time the employees of the center take to learn its rules.
It is then reasonable to assume that there are costs to set-up and operate the
center. Set-up costs make it conceivable that these costs are partly independent of
how frequently status levels are updated. This partial independence of costs from the
frequency by which status levels change can also arise due to lower potential changes,
if this makes it faster to process the outcome of each match and, thus, reduces the
time needed for the center to update status levels. In particular, it is reasonable that
the least costly way of running the center is when no change to individuals’ status
levels is ever required, i.e. when the transition Tnc defined by
Tnc(x, a) = x for each x ∈ X and a ∈ A
is used, as this would require minimal set-up costs and no updating costs. Costs can
be very small; what is important is that different transition functions, and different
trading norms more generally, may have different costs.
To formulate the above, we now assume that it is costly for the center to imple-
ment any given stationary trading norm µ = (pi, q). Since what is important is to
compare the costs associated with different stationary trading norms, these costs will
be represented by a real number. Due to the presence of set-up costs, these costs may
differ across time and, thus, we let them be time-dependent; for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
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Ft(µ) denotes the total cost incurred by the center to implement µ in period t.
A concrete example to illustrate the above is as follows. It uses the following
notation: For each trading norm µ = (pi, q), let
C(µ) = {(x, a) ∈ X × A : T (x, a) ̸= x}
be the set of status-action profiles at which the status profile changes.
Example: Suppose that, in addition to the N perishable goods, there is another
perishable good, good 0. Good 0 is a good that cannot be produced: The center
has an endowment W > 0 of good 0 in period 0 and zero in subsequent periods;
individuals have an endowment w > 0 of good 0 in each period. Good 0 is the
only good that the center values: The center’s preferences are described by
∑∞
t=0 β
tct
where {ct}∞t=0 is his sequence of good 0 consumption. The cost of updating individuals’
status levels are in terms of good 0 and are given, for each stationary norm and for
some φv, φf > 0, by F0(µ) = φv
∑
x:T (x)̸=x qx + φf |C(µ)| and Ft(µ) = φv
∑
x:T (x)̸=x qx
for each t > 0.19 In this example, costs depend on the frequency by which status
levels are changed in every period; furthermore, in period 0, costs also depend on the
number of status-action profiles at which the status profile changes, this to capture
how complex the procedure used to process the changes to individuals’ status levels
is, e.g. as a measure of how difficult it is to write the computer program used for
this task, and/or how much computational power is needed, and/or how much time
the employees of the center take to learn its rules. These set-up costs can, however,
be insignificant as compared to variable costs: This case is obtained by setting, for
instance, φv = 1 and then setting φf as close to zero as desired.
We impose three conditions on the sequence of cost functions (these conditions
are satisfied in the above example). First, the costs of any stationary norm with
T = Tnc are normalized to zero: For each stationary trading norm µ = (B, T, q) such
that T = Tnc,
Ft(µ) = 0 for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (10)
19For each x = (xp, xc) ∈ X, qx = qxpqxc .
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Second, costs are nonnegative and non-increasing with time: For each stationary
trading norm µ,
0 ≤ Ft+1(µ) ≤ Ft(µ) for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (11)
This condition captures, in particular, the case where set-up costs decrease to zero
and variable costs are time-independent. Our third condition requires that, for each
stationary trading norms µ = (pi, q) and µ′ = (pi′, q′), we have that
F0(µ) < F0(µ
′) and Ft(µ) ≤ Ft(µ′) for each t > 0 whenever C(µ) ⊂ C(µ′),
q = q′ and {x ∈ X : (x,B(x)) ∈ C(µ)} ⊆ {x ∈ X : (x,B′(x)) ∈ C(µ′)}.
(12)
In simple terms, this condition says that norms with less changes to individuals’ status
levels cost less. Looking at it in more detail, the condition C(µ) ⊂ C(µ′) means (i)
that every status-action profile (x, a) at which there is a change in the status profile
under µ is such that a change in the status profile also occurs under µ′ and (ii) that
there is a status-action profile (xˆ, aˆ) at which there is a change in the status profile
under µ′ but not under µ. If aˆ = B′(xˆ) = B(xˆ) and qxˆ = q′xˆ > 0, then this change
occurs in every period both under µ and µ′ and, thus, its cost can be thought to
be a variable cost; in this case, µ would have lower variable costs that µ′ and one
could reasonably require not only that F0(µ) < F0(µ
′) but also that Ft(µ) < Ft(µ′)
for all t > 0. But none of this is required; in particular, aˆ may differ from B′(xˆ),
in which case the cost associated with it is either a set-up cost or is, in some other
way, unrelated to the frequency by which status profiles change when a trading norm
is followed. As noted before, this can occur when lower potential changes make it
faster to process the outcome of each match and, thus, reduce the time needed for
the center to update status levels.
Thus, the frequency by which status levels change is not the only factor determin-
ing the center’s costs in (12). However, these alternative factors matter to conclude
that µ is less costly than µ′ only if both norms have the same stationary distribution
(i.e. q = q′) and it is the case that every status profile at which there is a transition
on the equilibrium path of µ is such that a transition also occurs on the equilibrium
path of µ′ (i.e. {x ∈ X : (x,B(x)) ∈ C(µ)} ⊆ {x ∈ X : (x,B′(x)) ∈ C(µ′)}). This
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two conditions imply that
∑
x:T (x,B(x)) ̸=x qx ≤
∑
x:T ′(x,B′(x))̸=x q
′
x; thus, in particular,
set-up and other types of costs matter to conclude that µ is less costly than µ′ only if
the frequency by which status levels are changed in every period is no larger under µ
than under µ′. This is a way of expressing, in general, that set-up and other types of
costs can be insignificant relative to variable costs in comparing two stationary norms
in terms of their costs.
We consider the examples of Section 2.3 to illustrate condition (12). We say that
µ is less costly than µ′ if F0(µ) < F0(µ′) and Ft(µ) ≤ Ft(µ′) for each t > 0; this defines
a binary relation on stationary norms which is not complete, i.e. several stationary
norms cannot be compared. Condition (12) allows us to compare some stationary
norms. For example: (i) µ = (pi, q) with q1 = 1 and T = Tnc is less costly than µ
G;
(ii) µ = (pi, q) with q0 ∈ (0, 1) and T = Tnc is less costly than µM = (piM , q); (iii)
µM = (piM , q) with q0 = 1/2 is less costly than µ
GM ; and (iv) µGM is less costly than
µP .20 Intuitively, in (i)–(iv), there are less contingencies in which there is a change in
status profile in the least costly norm; also, in these examples, the least costly norm
is easier to write down as it requires less conditions in the definition of the transition
function.
Condition (12), however, does not allow us to compare all stationary norms. This
holds, for example, in the case where µ = µG and µ′ is some µM = (piM , q) ∈ M as
qG ̸= q; even if qG is changed as in Footnote 17 so that qG0 ∈ (0, 1), condition (12)
still does not allow us to compare µG with µM since neither C(µG) ⊂ C(µM) nor
C(µM) ⊂ C(µG) hold.
2.5.2 The social planner
The social planner has two roles: First, to choose a stationary norm µ = (pi, q) (to
maximize the social ranking of stationary norms described in the next section) and,
second, to monitor and incentivize the center to follow it. As we shall discuss in the
remark at the end of this section, the social planner can be thought of as a group of
20Regarding (i), we have that q = qG, {x ∈ X : (x,B(x)) ∈ C(µ)} = {x ∈ X : (x,BG(x)) ∈
C(µG)} = ∅ and C(µ) = ∅ ⊂ {((1, 1), a) : ap ̸= y} = C(µG), hence, condition (12) applies.
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individuals. We start, however, to describe it as a god-like entity to avoid discussing
incentive problems it might face; in other words, the social planner will not be a player
in the game played by the center and the individuals that we shall now describe.
The interaction between the center and the individuals takes place as follows.
Given the stationary norm µ chosen by the social planner, the initial, period 0, status
level of each individual is determined according to the distribution q (in particular,
q is the initial distribution of status levels). In each period t ≥ 0 and after the
individuals have been matched in pairs, in each single-coincidence match, the producer
and consumer make their choices (of how much to produce and of whether or not to
accept to trade, respectively) and, then, the center chooses next period status level of
each of these two individuals. In no-coincidence meetings both individuals are forced
to choose a zero production level and the center is forced to choose the same status
levels for the two individuals in that meeting. These actions are observed by all, i.e.
by each individual, the center and the social planner.
In the attempt to incentivize the center to follow µ, the social planner has to
monitor the outcome path. Specifically, for each period t ≥ 0 and history ht, the
social planner needs to determine whether or not µ has being followed in the past.
A period t-history ht consists of individuals’ states in periods 0, . . . , t, matches in
periods 0, . . . , t and individuals’ actions in periods 0, . . . , t − 1. A stationary norm
µ has been followed in the past at history ht if, for each x ∈ X with qx > 0, the
fraction of individuals in single-coincidence matches who move from state-profile x to
T (x,B(x)) in periods 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t− 1 equals 1.
The monitoring task of the social planner is simple. Assume that the center
chooses, at every history ht with t ≥ 0, to update status levels in a symmetric
way (e.g. because it is prohibitively expensive to do otherwise), i.e. by choosing
a transition function Tht : X × A → X but not necessarily equal to the transition
function T which is part of µ.21 Then the social planner needs to sample, for each
x ∈ X with qx > 0, only one match with state-profile x. Indeed, with such sample
21In full generality, the center could choose any (measurable) mapping from individuals in single-
coincidence matches to statues levels.
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and with probability 1, the social planner correctly finds out whether or not the
trading norm has been followed. In particular, monitoring the center is considerably
simpler than to update individuals’ status levels and this provides a justification for
the delegation of the latter task from the social planner to the center.
The incentives for the center to follow µ are then provided as follows: If µ has
been followed in the past, then the center receives in period t an amount c(µ) ∈ R+;
otherwise the center receives nothing. The interpretation is that c(µ) is a stationary
measure of the costs associated with µ and that are ultimately paid by the individuals.
For concreteness, we specify that this amount is collected from the individuals by the
social planner and then given to the center; this is illustrated in the following example,
which also illustrates a more decentralized alternative of making the payment of c(µ)
to the center.
Example (continued): In the context of the example of Section 2.5.1, and
given a stationary norm µ, the payment the center receives when he follows T is
c(µ) = φv
∑
x:T (x)̸=x qx+(1−β)φf |C(µ)| in each period and in units of good 0; c(µ) is
paid to the center by the social planner after collecting c(µ)/N units of good 0 from
each individual (recall that the measure of the total population is N). Making c(µ)
be time-independent implies that the individuals still face a stationary environment
even in the presence of time-dependent costs. In this example, the center has to pay
the initial set-up cost φf |C(µ)|, thus obtaining a sequence of consumption of good 0
with c0 = W −φf |C(µ)|+(1−β)φf |C(µ)| = W −βφf |C(µ)| and ct = (1−β)φf |C(µ)|
for each t ≥ 1, which gives him the same utility as his endowment {c¯t}∞t=0 where
c¯0 = W and c¯t = 0 for each t ≥ 1.22
One way to decentralize this payment is to consider a more detailed interaction
between the center and the individuals, whereby, at the beginning of each period, the
social planner announces whether or not µ has been followed in the past and then
individuals choose whether or not to pay c(µ)/N units of good 0 to the center (the
social planner’s announcement concerns now only the single-coincidence matches in
22We assume that W > βφf |C(µ)| and Nw > φv
∑
x:T (x)̸=x qx + (1 − β)φf |C(µ)| for each µ to
guarantee that all these quantities are positive.
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which both individuals have paid).23 Consider strategies that are such that: (i) the
center does not change the status profile in any single-coincidence match where at
least one of the two individuals has failed to pay, and (ii) each individual pays c(µ)/N
to the center if and only if the social planner announces that µ has been followed in
the past and (iii), in single-coincidence matches where some individual did not pay,
the producer chooses not to produce. Assume that the extra utility of consuming
z units of good 0 in a period is ξz independently of the level of consumption and
production of the other N goods, where ξ > 0.24 Then, the choices described in (ii)
and (iii) are optimal provided that mins∈{0,1} Vs(µ) ≥ ξc(µ)N .25,26 The choice described
in (i) is also optimal as making no changes to status levels is the least costly way of
updating them.27
In general, we assume that the center’s preferences are represented by
∑∞
t=0 δ
tv(γt)
for each (bounded, real-valued) sequence {γt}∞t=0 of net payments, where δ ∈ (0, 1)
and v : R→ R is continuous and strictly increasing, with v(0) = 0. The amount c(µ)
is then defined to be the smallest c ∈ R such that, for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the center
weakly prefers the sequence of net payments {c− Ft(µ), c− Ft+1(µ), c− Ft+2(µ), . . .}
23Recall the timing: First, matches are realized, then individuals make their choices, and then
the center chooses how to update states; now, before matches have been realized, the social planner
makes the announcement and each individual chooses to pay or not.
24More explicitly, the overall period utility of an individual of type n who consumes z units of good
0 and y′ ∈ Y units of good n, and produces y ∈ Y units of good n+1 (modulo N) is u(y′)− y+ ξz.
25To see this, suppose that an individual chooses not to pay and that this is an one-shot, unilateral,
deviation. Since the center will then choose not to update status levels in the match of the deviating
individual, it follows that no production will take place in such match. Hence, the deviating player
obtains a continuation payoff of β
(
Vs + ξ
(
w − c(µ)N
))
, where s ∈ {0, 1} is his status level at the
time of the deviation. If, instead, he chooses not to deviate, then his continuation payoff is Vs +
ξ
(
w − c(µ)N
)
. Hence, the deviation is not profitable if mins∈{0,1} Vs(µ) ≥ ξc(µ)N .
26If this formalization replaces the one where the social planner collects payment from each indi-
vidual, then such a voluntary participation constraint needs to be added as an equilibrium condition.
Our main results, however, continue to hold as currently stated.
27The center is still assumed to update status levels in a symmetric way, now meaning a transition
function Tht : X ×A× {pay,not pay}2 → X.
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to the zero sequence, i.e.
c(µ) = min
{
c ∈ R :
∞∑
k=t
δk−tv(c− Fk(µ)) ≥ 0 for each t ≥ 0
}
.
Thus, c(µ) is the smallest stationary per period payment to the center that incentivizes
him to follow his part of the trading norm µ.28
The following lemma states two implications of the above assumptions.
Lemma 1 Let µ = (pi, q) and µ′ = (pi′, q′) be stationary norms. Then:
1. c(µ) exists and belongs to [0, F0(µ)].
2. c(µ) < c(µ′) whenever C(µ) ⊂ C(µ′), q = q′ and {x ∈ X : (x,B(x)) ∈ C(µ)} ⊆
{x ∈ X : (x,B′(x)) ∈ C(µ′)}.
Remark: The interaction between the individuals and the center can be fully
decentralized and, thus, the social planner can be completely eliminated. In the
above example, we described how the payment from the individuals to the center
could be decentralized. Here, we focus on the monitoring of the centre and assume,
for simplicity, that the payment to the center is obtained via lump-sum taxes on the
individuals. To decentralize the monitoring of the center, two individuals are selected
(at period 0 or in each period, randomly or deterministically) and each performs the
statistical test (i.e. samples, for each x ∈ X with qx > 0, one match with state-profile
x) independently of the others. If all observe T (x,B(x)) for each x ∈ X, then it is
concluded that µ has been followed in the past and the payment c(µ) is made to the
center; otherwise, the taxes stop being collected and paid to the center. Each one of
the two individuals have an incentive to report truthfully if the other is doing so.29
28It may be that the center is, ex-ante, no different from the individuals engaged in trading. In
this case, we would require that the ex-ante expected utility of the center be equal to that of an
individual engaged in trade. This would change the value of c(µ) but not our results.
29The details, including the importance of having a group of two individuals, are as follows.
Consider a non-autarkic stationary norm. If, at some history, the payment to the center stops, then
the center stops updating status levels and, consequently, producers stop producing; i.e. the outcome
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2.5.3 Equilibrium
Summarizing the above, we have defined a repeated game with complete information
with the following elements. The players are the center and the individuals. In each
period, the actions available are: Consumers in single-coincidence matches choose
0 (accept) or 1 (reject) and producers choose y ∈ Y ; individuals in no-coincidence
matches have only one action available: 0 ∈ Y ; the center chooses status levels for
those individuals in single-coincidence matches according to a function T ′ : X ×A→
X; in no-coincidence matches, the center has only one choice, namely, Tnc.
Finally, payoffs are as follows. Each individual’s payoff is the expected discounted
utility received in his sequence of matches. We assume that the payment of c(µ) affects
periodwise utility in a separable way as in the above example, so that the incentive
conditions for each individual in a single-coincidence match remain (7) and (8) at
histories where the strategy profile recommends that µ is followed in all subsequent
periods.30
As for the center: If, at a given history ht, t ≥ 0, µ has been observed in
the past, then following µ from period t onwards means that the center receives∑∞
k=t δ
k−tv(c(µ)−Fk(µ)). In addition, we specify that if a deviation at ht implies that,
in the subsequent periods, µ has no longer been followed in the past, then the centre’s
payoff is at most 0. This means that any choice of the center leads to a sequence
{γk}∞k=t of nonnegative costs and, thus, the center’s payoff is
∑∞
k=t δ
k−tv(−γk) ≤ 0
since the payment c(µ) is no longer received. Moreover, we specify that if such devi-
will be autarkic. If there is only one individual in the group, then he would have an incentive to
deviate at an history where the center has failed to update status levels according to T since, by
continuing to pay the center instead of following the strategy by stoping that payment, he obtains a
higher payoff from the non-autarkic norm than from the autarkic outcome. In contrast, in a group
of two, such deviation is no longer profitable for each individual in the group because the other will
stop the payment regardless of his choice.
30As another example, suppose that each individual of type n produces and gives, to the social
planner or to the center directly, c(µ)/N units of good n+1 (modulo N). Then, in each period, his
utility is u(y)− c(µ)/N if he consumes in his match, −y − c(µ)/N if he produces in his match, and
−c(µ)/N otherwise.
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ation by the center consists in Tnc being chosen at ht and onwards, then the center’s
payoff is 0 in line with (10), i.e. choosing Tnc leads to minimal costs which have been
normalized to zero, so that γk = 0 for each k ≥ t.
A strategy for each player is a mapping from histories into actions. Thus, for each
history and realization of future matches, a strategy determines a sequence of actions
for the center and the individuals which, in turn, determines their payoffs.
We then say that a stationary trading norm µ is an equilibrium if there is a
subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game such that, for each t = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
for each history in which µ has been followed in the past, and each single-coincidence
match in period t, the center uses T to update individuals’ status levels and individuals
choose according to B. In other words, µ is followed in the equilibrium path of some
subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game. Recall that the set of equilibria
is denoted by E.
Equilibria in this model have a simple characterization.
Lemma 2 A stationary trading norm µ = (pi, q) is an equilibrium only if (7) and
(8) hold and, for each (x, a) ∈ X × A,
T (x, a) = x whenever a ̸= B(x). (13)
Conversely, a stationary trading norm µ = (pi, q) is an equilibrium if (7), (8) and
(13) hold and, for each x ∈ X,
T (x,B(x)) = x whenever qx = 0. (14)
In the particular case where q0 ∈ (0, 1), which holds in any monetary trading norm
and, as we will shown, in any equilibrium trading norm other than autarky, (14) is
trivially satisfied. Thus, in this case, a stationary trading norm is an equilibrium if and
only if the individuals’ incentive constrains (7) and (8) hold and the center’s incentive
condition (13) holds. We interpret (13) has stating that memory is incentive-feasible.
It arises because the presence of costs that are independent of the frequency by which
status profiles change implies that changes to individuals’ status levels that are never
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used (namely, those off the equilibrium path) should be discarded, thus reducing the
costs that the center faces.
We note that the necessity of (13) for a stationary norm to be an equilibrium
allows for the possibility that individuals may slightly tremble when choosing their
actions. For instance, if the probability that each individual trembles (i.e. chooses
an action different from B(x) at status profile x) is sufficiently small, independent
across individuals and such that the exact law of large numbers hold (see e.g. Sun
(2006) and Podczeck (2010)), then it still pays for the center to discard the changes
described in (13): While these changes are sometimes used, they happen very in-
frequently. Intuitively, (13) formalizes the view expressed in Rubinstein (1986) and
cited in the introduction that “social institutions, various types of organizations, and
human abilities degenerate or are readily discarded if they are not used regularly”.
As also noted in the introduction, evidence for (13) can be found in Bigoni, Camera,
and Casari (2014) and Camera and Casari (2014): In the benchmark treatment in
both papers, there is evidence that subjects were reluctant to update (or, at least, act
upon) information on other individuals’ past behavior when off-the-equilibrium path.
This is also evident in Camera and Casari (2018) where subjects could, by incurring
a small cost, make the action of the player with whom they were matched be publicly
know; despite this option, subjects did not always reported deviations and, in fact, it
did not help in supporting an efficient outcome.
2.5.4 Optimum problem
Recall that the optimum problem is described by a social ranking ≻ of stationary
trading norms and that an optimal equilibrium is µ∗ ∈ E such that there is no µ ∈ E
with µ ≻ µ∗. In this section we describe the conditions we impose on the social
ranking of stationary trading norms.
When the cost of operating the center is paid by the individuals, as described
in the examples of Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, these costs should be part of the social
ranking of stationary trading norms. In fact, in these examples, the average expected
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discounted utility of a stationary norm µ equals
W ∗(µ) = W (µ) + ξ
(
w − c(µ)
N
)
and, thus, the average expected discounted utility of a stationary norm decreases
with its cost.31 In light of this, we assume that, for each pair of stationary norms
µ = (pi, q) and µ′ = (pi′, q′),
if c(µ) < c(µ′), q = q′ and W (µ) = W (µ′) then µ ≻ µ′. (15)
This condition says that if two stationary norms have the same stationary distribution
and yield the same average expected discounted utility (when the cost c(µ) is not
included) but one is less costly than the other, then the former is strictly preferred
to the latter.
The second and last condition we impose on ≻ is a symmetry requirement. Note
that the status level is an abstraction and, therefore, can be interchanged without
changing the outcome of a trading norm. Interchanging status levels means that
x ∈ X is mapped into (1, 1)− x = (1− xp, 1− xc); for convenience, let g : X → X be
defined by g(x) = (1, 1)− x for each x ∈ X. We then say that two stationary norms
µ and µˆ are symmetric, denoted by µSµˆ, if either µ = µˆ or
(qˆ0, qˆ1) = (q1, q0),
Bˆ(x) = B(g(x)) for each x ∈ X, and
Tˆ (x, a) = g(T (g(x), a)) for each (x, a) ∈ X × A.
We now require that the social ranking of symmetric stationary norms be unchanged:
For all stationary norms µ, µ′, µˆ, µ¯,
if µSµˆ and µ′Sµ¯, then µ′ ≻ µ if and only if µ¯ ≻ µˆ. (16)
We remark that these two properties are satisfied if (a) ≻ is represented by µ 7→
W (µ)− ξc(µ) for some ξ > 0, (b) ≻ is represented by µ 7→ ln(max{0,W (µ)})− c(µ)
or (c) if µ ≻ µ′ if and only if (W (µ),−c(µ)) >L (W (µ′),−c(µ′)), where >L is the
lexicographic order in R2.
31Note that if c(µ) = 0 for each µ as in Section 2.4, then maximizingW is equivalent to maximizing
W ∗.
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3 Optimality of monetary trading
In this section we consider non-autarkic trading norms and provide a characterization
of non-autarkic equilibria and of non-autarkic optimal equilibria.
A non-autarkic trading norm is one where a strictly positive quantity is traded
with strictly positive probability. Formally, a stationary norm µ is non-autarkic if
there exists x ∈ X such that qx > 0 and y(x) > 0. Any monetary trading norm is
non-autarkic and so are all the norms in Section 2.3 except for µC , i.e. µG, µP and
µGM are all non-autarkic.
The introduction of (13) as an equilibrium condition does not preclude the use of
intertemporal incentives to support myopically non-optimal actions. It does, however,
change the nature of these intertemporal incentives: Instead of punishing the devi-
ation from a prescribed myopically non-optimal action (such as in the grim-trigger
norm µG), equilibrium norms have now to reward the choice of such an action. This
element is present in any monetary trading norm and also in µP and µGM . But is
each of them an (optimal) equilibrium?
Before stating our main results, we note that V1(µ) ≥ V0(µ) holds in all our
examples. This amounts just to a normalization and can always be assumed. The
following lemma makes this formal by stating that any equilibrium trading norm is
symmetric to an equilibrium trading norm with the same average expected discounted
utility in which status 1 has the highest value.
Lemma 3 For each µ ∈ E, there exists µˆ ∈ E such that µSµˆ, W (µˆ) = W (µ) and
V1(µˆ) ≥ V0(µˆ).
Our first main result in this section shows that any non-autarkic equilibrium is,
in terms of aggregate quantities traded, observationally equivalent to an equilibrium
monetary trading norm yielding the same average expected discounted utility. It
states that any non-autarkic equilibrium trading norm with V1(µ) ≥ V0(µ) has the
same average expected discounted utility of an equilibrium monetary trading norm
with the same stationary distribution and the same traded quantities at each status
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profile. This means that the aggregate quantities, including the fraction of single-
coincidence matches in which there is trade, the quantity traded in such case and,
hence, total output and consumption, of any non-autarkic equilibrium µ coincides
with that of an equilibrium monetary trading norm.
Proposition 1 If µ = (B, T, q) ∈ E is non-autarkic and such that V1(µ) ≥ V0(µ),
then there is piM = (BM , TM) such that (piM , q) ∈ M ∩ E, W (piM , q) = W (µ) and
yM(x) = y(x) for each x ∈ X.
It is easy to see why certain non-autarkic trading norms are not an equilibrium.
For instance, the grim-trigger norm µG does not satisfy (13) when the status profile is
(1, 1) and the producer chooses not to produce. Thus, it fails to be an equilibrium as
the center has no incentive to use its transition function to update individuals’ status
levels. The monetary trading norm with charity and a vow of poverty µP satisfies (13)
but, nevertheless, fails to be an equilibrium. Specifically, (8) fails as the consumer
in a single-coincidence meeting with statues profile (1, 1) has an incentive to deviate
and, thus, keep, by virtue of (13), a status of 1. Indeed, if he does not deviate, then
his next period status level is 0 and his current consumption is also zero.
In general, it is easy to see that any non-autarkic equilibrium µ satisfies y(1, 0) =
y(1, 1) = 0 because, as pointed out before, the choice of a strictly positive production
level requires the producer to be rewarded with a transition to a more valuable status
level. It is also easy to see that q0 > 0 and that y(0, 0) > 0 or y(0, 1) > 0 since µ is
non-autarkic. More surprisingly is that it cannot be that y(0, 0) > 0 and y(0, 1) > 0,
and that it turns out that y(0, 0) = 0 and y(0, 1) > 0.32
In summary, by using (7), (8) and (13), we show that any non-autarkic equilibrium
has to satisfy y(0, 0) = y(1, 0) = y(1, 1) = 0, 0 < y(0, 1) < u(y(0, 1)), Tp(0, 1) = 1,
32This conclusion would be easy to reach in the coordination mechanism of Kocherlakota and
Wallace (1998) in the case of no memory as it imposes, for each a ∈ A, T ((0, 1), a) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)},
T ((1, 0), a) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, T ((0, 0), a) = (0, 0) and T ((1, 1), a) = (1, 1). These restrictions make
sense in Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) because, in their setting without memory, status levels
are very specific, namely, quantities of a portable object. Here, in contrast, status levels are just
abstract records of the past and, hence, we do not impose these restrictions.
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Tc(1, 1) = 1, q0 ∈ (0, 1) as in any monetary trading and also β V1−V01−β ≥ y(0, 1) (which is
the incentive condition for producers to produce y(0, 1) at single-coincidence meetings
with a status profile (0, 1)). In general, the remaining values of the transition function
cannot be pinned down. However, and somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that the
monetary trading norm with the same stationary distribution of the given equilibrium
and with the same production level at single-coincidence meetings with a status profile
(0, 1) is an equilibrium and yields the same average expected discounted utility as the
given equilibrium. In this sense, monetary trading norms obtain a given average
expected discounted utility in a minimally demanding way in terms of individuals’
incentives to follow its rules.
Proposition 1, however, imposes no conditions on the transition function of non-
autarkic equilibrium trading norms other than Tp(0, 1) = 1 and Tc(1, 1) = 1. For this
reason, there is no guarantee that any non-autarkic equilibrium is observationally
equivalent to an equilibrium monetary trading norm in terms of individual quantities
consumed and produced. An example where this property fails is provided by the
grim-monetary trading norm µGM in the case of binary production (i.e. Y = {0, y}
where 0 < y < u(y)) and β ∈ (0, 1) such that β V1−V0
1−β = y.
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As we next show, the observational equivalence to an equilibrium monetary trad-
ing norm in terms of individual quantities consumed and produced holds in any
non-autarkic optimal equilibrium. Specifically, using Proposition 1, we now obtain
that, whenever there is a non-autarkic optimal equilibrium, optimal equilibria are
symmetric to a monetary trading norm. Thus, effectively, there is a unique optimal
equilibrium, namely the best equilibrium monetary trading norm.
Corollary 1 If µ∗ is non-autarkic and an optimal equilibrium, then there is µˆ ∈ M
such that µ∗Sµˆ.
Some intuition for Corollary 1 is as follows. From Proposition 1 we have that
any non-autarkic equilibrium µ with V1(µ) ≥ V0(µ) is such that 0 < Bp(0, 1) <
33Specifically, β = 2Ny/(2Ny + u(y) − y). As qGM0 = 1/2 ∈ (0, 1), µGM is an equilibrium if and
only if (7), (8) and (13) hold; each of these conditions is easily seen to hold.
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u(Bp(0, 1)) and Bc(0, 1) = 1 as in any monetary trading norm. Moreover, we have
that Tp(0, 1) = Tc(1, 1) = 1 also as in any monetary trading norm. Corollary 1
strengthens these conclusions when µ is optimal. First, monetary trading norms
economize on updating costs as status profiles only change at x = (0, 1) when B(0, 1)
is chosen, a change that occurs in every non-autarkic equilibrium. Second, if it were
the case that a producer offers to produce at a status profile x ̸= (0, 1) where no trade
occurs (which, thus, implies that the consumer is refusing the offer), the consumer
would have an incentive to deviate from the prescribed behavior in µ by accepting the
producer’s offer. These two properties imply that Bp(x) = 0 for each x ̸= (0, 1) and
T (x, a) = x for each (x, a) ̸= ((0, 1), B(0, 1)) and this shows that any non-autarkic
optimal equilibrium must be monetary.
We conclude this section by commenting on the assumption of Corollary 1, which
requires the existence of a non-autarkic optimal equilibrium. Intuitively, this property
should hold provided that the costs c(µ) of non-autarkic stationary norms µ are not
“too big” or not “too important”. This is illustrated in the context of the examples
in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
Example (continued): Suppose, in addition, that N = 3, Y = [0, y¯] with y¯ > 1,
and u(y) = 2
√
y for each y ∈ Y . Consider the monetary trading norm µM with
q0 ∈ (0, 1) and y = 1 and assume that β ∈ (0, 1) is such that β V1(µM )−V0(µM )1−β ≥ 1.
Then µM is an equilibrium and W (µM) = q0(1 − q0)2/3. Moreover, c(µM) = q0(1 −
q0)φv+(1−β)φf . The presence of c(µM) means that the average expected discounted
utility is W ∗(µM) = q0(1− q0)2/3 + ξ(w − c(µM)/3) = ξw + q0(1− q0)(2/3− ξφv)−
(1− β)ξφf . Autarky is obtained with µ˜ = (Bnt, Tnc, q) where Bnt(x) = (0, 0) for each
x ∈ X (i.e. no trade at each status profile); we have that W ∗(µ˜) = ξw. Letting
≻ be represented by W ∗, it follows that a non-autarkic optimal equilibrium exists
if q0(1 − q0)(2/3 − ξφv) − (1 − β)ξφf > 0. In particular, it exists if φv and φf are
sufficiently close to zero; moreover, if we let q0 = 1/2 and β = 6/7, then µ
M is an
equilibrium and is ranked higher than autarky if ξ(7φv+6φf ) < 7. Another example,
now with a “low” value for β, is as follows: If β = 1/2 = q0 and y = 4/49, then a
34
non-autarkic optimal equilibrium exists if ξ(φv + 2φf ) < 8/49.
4 Discussion
Our optimality result for monetary trading requires some constraints on the class
of possible trading norms, which we now discuss. The requirement that trading
mechanism be symmetric across individuals seems innocuous, but requiring them
to be pure, stationary and binary does not. We shall argue below that the binary
requirement is the really restrictive one.
We shall also conjecture that our results extend to the case where individuals’
types are not observable.
4.1 Stochastic mechanisms
As Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (2002) have shown, monetary trading norms can
be made more efficient by allowing for random transitions. However, in our setting
where transitions are chosen by a center who has costs to update individuals’ status
levels, it is conceivable that random transition be more costly that pure ones and
that, therefore, the center optimally chooses pure transitions. We present such an
extension in what follows.
A trading mechanism is now pi = (B, ρ) where ρ : X × A → [0, 1]2 is a random
transition function: For each i ∈ {p, c}, x ∈ X and a ∈ A, ρi(x, a) is the probability
that Ti(x, a) = 0. For convenience, let ρi(x) = ρi(x,B(x)) for each i ∈ {p, c} and
x ∈ X.
In the description of the interaction between the center and the individuals, the
condition determining whether or not center receives the payment c(µ) is now as
follows: The stationary norm µ has been followed in the past at history ht if, for
each x ∈ X with qx > 0, a fraction ρi(x) of individuals whose role is i ∈ {p, c} in
single-coincidence matches move from state-profile x to 0 in periods 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t− 1.
We now specify costs in such a way that no changes to status levels with cer-
tainty is preferred to random change. Intuitively, the latter requires the center to
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perform the randomization and to make changes to a fraction of individuals. Fol-
lowing a stationary trading norm µ = (B, ρ, q) means that the center uses ρ to
determine next period’s status level of each individuals. This yields a sequence of
costs {F0(µ), F1(µ), . . .} analogously to what has been described in Section 2.5.1.
Suppose instead that the center proceeds as follows: First, it chooses fractions
(αp(x), αc(x)) of producers and consumers in single coincidence meetings with sta-
tus profile x, second, changes the status levels of these individuals according to
(ρ′p(x), ρ
′
c(x)) and, third, the status levels of the remaining fraction of individuals
are not changed, i.e. the next period’s status levels of a fraction 1−αp(x) of produc-
ers (resp. 1 − αc(x) of consumers) in single coincidence meetings with status profile
x is xp (resp. xc). Let Ft(µ, α) be the costs incurred by the center in period t by
using such strategy. Note that in the context of this section, the center following µ
means that he uses ρ to determine next period’s status level of each individuals, i.e.
αi(x) = 1 for each i ∈ {p, c} and x ∈ X. Moreover, if, for each i ∈ {p, c}, x ∈ X and
a ∈ A, ρi(x, a) ∈ {0, 1} holds in addition to αi(x) = 1, then all transitions are pure
and Ft(µ, α) is the same as Ft(µ) in Section 2.5.1.
In addition to appropriately modified version of conditions (10)–(12), we now
assume that, for each stationary trading norm µ,
if αi(x) < α
′
i(x) for each (i, x) ∈ {p, c} ×X, then Ft(µ, α) < Ft(µ, α′) for each t ≥ 0.
(17)
Under (17), we then have that any equilibrium µ will be pure: ρi(x, a) ∈ {0, 1}
for each i ∈ {p, c}, x ∈ X and a ∈ A. Indeed, by an appropriate version of (12),
status levels do not change off the equilibrium path; thus, ρi(x, a) = 1 − xi for each
i ∈ {p, c}, x ∈ X and a ̸= B(x) (i.e. if xi = 0, then ρi(x, a) = 1 so that i’s status
level will be equal to 0). Moreover, if ρi(x) is not pure, i.e. ρi(x,B(x)) ̸∈ {0, 1} for
some i ∈ {p, c} and x ∈ X, then the center can set αi(x) < 1, increase ρi(x) to ρ′i(x)
if xi = 1 and decrease ρi(x) to ρ
′
i(x) if xi = 0 to guarantee that µ has been followed
in the past.34 But (17) then implies that this is a profitable deviation and that µ is
34Specifically, let αi(x) > ρi(x) and ρ
′
i(x) = ρi(x)/αi(x) if xi = 1. If xi = 0, then let αi(x) >
1− ρi(x) and ρ′i(x) = [ρi(x)− (1− αi(x))]/αi(x).
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not an equilibrium.
4.2 Non-stationary mechanisms
Focusing on norms that are stationary is potentially restrictive. However, we argue
that the real restriction arises from a binary status space.
To see the above, suppose that we consider a set of status of the form N × S,
where the first component represents time. For example, B(t, x) would then be the
action profile to be played in period t in a single coincidence meeting where the second
component of the status profile equals x ∈ X = S2. Focusing on binary mechanisms
means that either (i) S has two elements and both B and T are independent of t or
(ii) S has one element, B depends only on whether or not t is even or odd and T
is such that an odd period follows an even one and vice versa, independently of the
action played.35
Proposition 1 characterizes non-autarkic equilibria in case (i). Equilibria in case
(ii) are easily characterized: When X has only one element, there cannot be any
reward for a producer producing today and, thus, there is a unique equilibrium con-
sisting of autarky. Thus, it is better to have a non-autarkic stationary norm (which
will be monetary) than to have a non-stationary one (which will be autarkic).
4.3 Non-binary mechanisms
The main question we leave open is whether or not our optimality result extends to
the case of a more general set of status levels. In the concluding remarks (Section
5), we loosely conjecture that it does extend. Here, instead, we outline some of the
difficulties of extending our optimality result beyond the case of binary status levels.
General sets of status levels open up interesting questions. For instance, when
the set of status levels is finite and sufficiently large, e.g. S = {0, . . . ,m} for some
m ∈ N sufficiently large, we can ask whether or not it is optimal to have a “law of
35This so that t is interpreted as time. In general, without this restriction, N would be replaced
with {0, 1} to meet the requirement of a binary mechanism and we would be back to case (i).
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one price”. Specifically, and assuming that y(x) = y > 0 whenever x ∈ X is such
that xp < m and xc > 0 analogously as in the definition of monetary trading norms,
is it optimal to have xc−Tc(x,B(x)) be equal to Tp(x,B(x))−xp (in which case such
common value can be interpreted as the price of y(x) = y units) and be independent
of x? It is likely that additional conditions are needed to obtain these conclusions
because otherwise it seems better to have such common value be bigger when xp = 0
or xc = m than otherwise to obtain a stationary distribution that puts less weight on
status level that imply no trade.
One possibility to overcome this issue is to assume that status levels are private
information. We have consider this in a previous paper, Carmona (2016), but allowing
only for portable-object mechanisms in which the portable object can only take two
values. Another possibility is to assume that the transition matrix of the Markov
chain governing the evolution of the distribution of status levels is symmetric. In
Carmona (2002a, Chapter 4) this condition, together conditions analogous to (7), (8)
and (13), has been shown to yield, in a model with two individuals but otherwise
analogous to the present one, the optimality of monetary trading for general finite
sets of status levels.
The above symmetry condition has, however, not been given a meaningful eco-
nomic interpretation. In this light, the appeal of binary status levels is that they allow
us to obtain economically meaningful and intuitively undemanding conditions on the
center’s costs and on the social ranking of stationary norms that render monetary
trading as the optimal trading norm.
4.4 Non-observable types
It seems likely that our results extend to the case where types are not observable by
adjusting the trading protocol in the following way. In any match, the two individuals
start by simultaneously reporting their types. Then the trading mechanism (i.e. B
and T ) applies with respect to the reported types. Each individual has an incentive
to report truthfully if all the others do so: The probability of being a producer (which
any individual would like to minimize) is always 1/N independently of the report;
38
but an individual who misreports his type has a zero probability of consuming the
good that he likes as opposed to 1/N when he reports truthfully. But given truthful
reporting, we are effectively back to the case of observable types.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we provided a setting where any optimal equilibria is indistinguishable
from monetary trading. Hence, in this setting, there is no surprise that monetary
trading should be observed. Monetary trading is described by particular rules re-
garding individual trading behavior and updating of individuals’ trading history; in
particular, it is independent of whether monetary trading is implementing using a spe-
cific object or whether it uses electronic money. This might explain the persistence
of monetary trading throughout time.
The optimality of monetary trading clearly holds in settings where monetary trad-
ing (broadly defined as a form of behavior where each person has a balance, which
rises when he gives up goods, and falls when he acquires goods) is efficient, as in the
case of centralized Arrow-Debreu markets. This is why we have focused on a setting
where trade is difficult and, thus, where the optimality of monetary trading is, in
principle, harder to establish. For these reasons, one expects that our optimality
result continues to hold in intermediate settings, such as that of Lagos and Wright
(2005) and Aliprantis, Camera, and Puzzello (2007), where trade is still difficult but
not as much as under fully decentralized trading and random-matching.
Despite the unresolved issues discussed in Section 4, we know that monetary
trading (with a rich set of possible status levels/money holdings and a sufficiently
high discount factor) is nearly efficient in several settings (e.g. Berentsen (2002),
Green and Zhou (2005), van der Schaar, Xu, and Zame (2013) and Olszewski and
Safronov (2018)). It is also the case that several authors have been able to find
trading mechanisms that dominate monetary trading. These include Kandori (1992)
and Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) as discussed in the introduction, Kocherlakota
(2002) (using a mechanism with two distinct portable objects which are disposable and
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can be concealed), Ellison (1994), Carmona (2002b), Araujo (2004) and Aliprantis,
Camera, and Puzzello (2007) (all of whom use contagious strategies) and Zhu and
Maenner (2012) (which considers an information-updating center as we do, but unlike
in our setting, the center does not observe the action taken in any given match; rather,
this is communicated by the individuals). The point of this paper is that some
intuitive limitations on information updating are enough to make monetary trading
an optimal equilibrium. By combining this and possibly additional such limitations
with the near-efficiency of monetary trading, it is then possible that this conclusion
might hold quite generally.
Despite the extreme nature of some of our assumptions, it is remarkable that
economically meaningful conditions imply that monetary trading norms are selected
as effectively the unique optimal equilibria. Under these conditions, it is then no
surprise that monetary trading persists.
A Appendix
A.1 Properties of the monetary trading norms
We first claim that any q ∈ ∆ is a stationary distribution of the Markov chain induced
by any trading mechanism satisfying (2), (3) and (4). In fact, any q ∈ ∆ is a solution
of
q0 = q0
(
q0
N
+
1
N
+
N − 2
N
)
+ q1
q0
N
,
q1 = 1− q0.
Fix q0 ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ Y . Let q1 = 1− q0 and µ = (pi, q) where pi satisfies (2), (3)
and (4). The expected discounted utility function V (µ) satisfies:
V0 =
−q1(1− β)y + β(q0V0 + q1V1)
N
+
(N − 2)βV0
N
+
βV0
N
,
V1 =
βV1
N
+
(N − 2)βV1
N
+
q0(1− β)u(y) + β(q0V0 + q1V1)
N
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Thus, we obtain that
V1 − V0
1− β =
q0u(y) + (1− q0)y
(1− β)N + β , and (18)
W (µ) = q0(1− q0)u(y)− y
N
. (19)
Suppose now that, in addition, 0 < q0 < 1 and 0 < y < u(y) so that µ ∈ M .
When x ̸= (0, 1), it is clear that µ satisfies both (7) and (8) since, in this case, the
left-hand side of (7) equals βVxp , the right-hand side of (7) is at most βVxp , and both
sides of (8) equal βVxc . When x = (0, 1), (8) is
β
V1 − V0
1− β ≤ u(y),
which holds by (18). Furthermore, when x = (0, 1), (7) is
β
V1 − V0
1− β ≥ y − y
′ for each y′ ∈ Y \ {y},
and, therefore, holds if and only if β V1−V0
1−β ≥ y. In conclusion:
Lemma 4 If µ ∈M , then µ is stationary and satisfies (8), (13) and (14). Moreover,
it satisfies (7) if and only if β V1−V0
1−β ≥ y.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Fix a stationary norm µ and let
C˜ =
{
c ∈ R :
∞∑
k=t
δk−tv(c− Fk(µ)) ≥ 0 for each t ≥ 0
}
.
The continuity of v implies that C˜ is closed. If c < 0 and t ∈ N0, the monotonicity
of v implies that
0 ≥
∞∑
k=t
δk−tv(−Fk(µ)) >
∞∑
k=t
δk−tv(c− Fk(µ));
hence, c ̸∈ C˜, i.e. C˜ ⊆ R+. Since F0(µ) ≥ Ft(µ) ≥ 0 for each t > 0, it follows again
by the monotonicity of v that F0(µ) ∈ C˜. Therefore, c(µ) = minc∈C˜∩[0,F0(µ)] c. Since
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c 7→ c is continuous and C˜ ∩ [0, F0(µ)] is compact and nonempty, the first part of the
lemma follows.
We next claim that
∑∞
k=0 δ
kv(c(µ)− Fk(µ)) = 0. By definition,
∑∞
k=0 δ
kv(c(µ)−
Fk(µ)) ≥ 0. Suppose that
∑∞
k=0 δ
kv(c(µ) − Fk(µ)) > 0. Then, by the continuity of
v, there exists c < c(µ) such that
∑∞
k=0 δ
kv(c − Fk(µ)) > 0. As Ft+1(µ) ≤ Ft(µ) for
each t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the monotonicity of v implies that, for each t > 0,
∞∑
k=t
δk−tv(c− Fk(µ)) ≥
∞∑
k=0
δkv(c− Fk(µ)) > 0
and, hence, c ∈ C˜. But this is a contradiction since c(µ) = min C˜. This contradiction
establishes the claim.
Let µ and µ′ be stationary norms satisfying the condition (12). We then have that
F0(µ) < F0(µ
′) and Ft(µ) ≤ Ft(µ′) for each t > 0. If c(µ) ≥ c(µ′), we would then
have that ∞∑
k=0
δkv(c(µ)− Fk(µ)) >
∞∑
k=0
δkv(c(µ′)− Fk(µ′)) ≥ 0,
a contradiction to the claim in the previous paragraph. This contradiction then
implies that c(µ) < c(µ′).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that µ = (B, T, q) ∈ E and that (13) does not hold. Define T ′ by setting
T ′(x,B(x)) = T (x,B(x)) and T ′(x, a) = x for each x ∈ X and a ̸= B(x), and let
µ′ = (B, T ′, q). Despite the center playing T ′ in every period, it is still the case that,
at every history h on the equilibrium path, µ has been followed in the past at h; thus,
the payment received by the center is c(µ) in every period. Moreover, (12) implies
that F0(µ
′) < F0(µ) and Ft(µ′) ≤ Ft(µ) for each t > 0. Thus, the center has an
incentive to deviate at t = 0, a contradiction to µ ∈ E. This contradiction shows
that (13) must hold.
Conversely, define the following strategy. At histories where µ has been followed
in the past, the center uses T and the individuals use B; otherwise, the center uses
Tnc and the individuals use Bnt defined by setting Bnt(x) = (0, 0) for each x ∈ X (in
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words, the center does not change status profiles and the individuals do not trade).
Let µ˜ = (Bnt, Tnc, q) (note that q is a stationary distribution of µ˜).
There are no profitable deviations in period t ≥ 0 at histories in which µ has been
followed in the past. For the individuals, this follows by (7) and (8). Regarding the
center, no deviation yields him a continuation payoff of
∑∞
k=t δ
k−tv(c(µ)−Fk(µ)) ≥ 0,
whereas a deviation yields him a continuation payoff of at most 0.
There are no profitable deviations in period t ≥ 0 at histories in which µ has not
been followed in the past. This is clear for individuals. As for the center, no deviation
yields him a continuation payoff of 0, whereas a deviation yields him a continuation
payoff of at most 0.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
A standard application of Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction and the
contraction mapping theorem establishes the uniqueness of the expected discounted
utility function. This is stated formally in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For each norm µ, the function V : S → R is unique.
Lemma 3 is a particular case of the following result (this more general result will
be used in the proof of Corollary 1).
Lemma 6 Let µ and µˆ be symmetric norms. Then:
1. If µ is stationary, then µˆ is stationary.
2. If µ ̸= µˆ, then yˆ(x) = y(g(x)) for each x ∈ X, where yˆ(x) = Bˆp(x)Bˆc(x).
3. W (µ) = W (µˆ).
4. If µ ̸= µˆ, then (V0(µˆ), V1(µˆ)) = (V1(µ), V0(µ)).
5. If µ satisfies (7), then µˆ satisfies (7).
6. If µ satisfies (8), then µˆ satisfies (8).
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7. If µ satisfies (13), then µˆ satisfies (13).
8. If µ satisfies (14), then µˆ satisfies (14).
Proof. All the properties clearly hold when µ = µˆ. Hence, assume that µ ̸= µˆ,
which implies that (qˆ0, qˆ1) = (q1, q0), Bˆ(x) = B(g(x)) for each x ∈ X and Tˆ (x, a) =
g(T (g(x), a)) for each (x, a) ∈ X × A.
The first property holds since
2qˆ0 = 2q1 = q0
 ∑
s:Tp(0,s)=1
qs +
∑
s:Tc(s,0)=1
qs
+ q1
 ∑
s:Tp(1,s)=1
qs +
∑
s:Tc(s,1)=1
qs

= qˆ1
 ∑
s:Tˆp(1,s)=0
qˆs +
∑
s:Tˆc(s,1)=0
qˆs
+ qˆ0
 ∑
s:Tˆp(0,s)=0
qˆs +
∑
s:Tˆc(s,0)=0
qˆs
 .
This shows that µˆ is stationary if µ is stationary.
For each x ∈ X, yˆ(x) = Bˆp(x)Bˆc(x) = Bp(g(x))Bc(g(x)) = y(g(x)), establishing
the second property.
The third property holds since
NW (µˆ) = qˆ0qˆ0[u(yˆ(0, 0))− yˆ(0, 0)] + qˆ0qˆ1[u(yˆ(0, 1))− yˆ(0, 1)]
+qˆ1qˆ0[u(yˆ(1, 0))− yˆ(1, 0)] + qˆ1qˆ1[u(yˆ(1, 1))− yˆ(1, 1)]
= q1q1[u(y(1, 1))− y(1, 1)] + q1q0[u(y(1, 0))− y(1, 0)]
+q0q1[u(y(0, 1))− y(0, 1)] + q0q0[u(y(0, 0))− y(0, 0)] = NW (µ).
Turning to the forth property, let V (µˆ) = (Vˆ0, Vˆ1) and V (µ) = (V0, V1), i.e. (Vˆ0, Vˆ1)
solves (5) and (6) when µˆ is the norm being used and (V0, V1) solves (5) and (6) when
µ is the norm being used.
We have that (V1, V0) also satisfies (5) and (6) when µˆ is the norm being used.
Note that this claim, together with Lemma 5, implies that (Vˆ0, Vˆ1) = (V1, V0). The
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claim follows since
qˆ0
[
−(1− β)yˆ(0, 0) + βV1−Tˆp(0,0) + (1− β)u(yˆ(0, 0)) + βV1−Tˆc(0,0)
]
+qˆ1
[
−(1− β)yˆ(0, 1) + βV1−Tˆp(0,1) + (1− β)u(yˆ(1, 0)) + βV1−Tˆc(1,0)
]
= q1
[−(1− β)y(1, 1) + βVTp(1,1) + (1− β)u(y(1, 1)) + βVTc(1,1)]
+q0
[−(1− β)y(1, 0) + βVTp(1,0) + (1− β)u(y(0, 1)) + βVTc(0,1)]
= [N − β(N − 2)]V1
and
qˆ0
[
−(1− β)yˆ(1, 0) + βV1−Tˆp(1,0) + (1− β)u(yˆ(0, 1)) + βV1−Tˆc(0,1)
]
+qˆ1
[
−(1− β)yˆ(1, 1) + βV1−Tˆp(1,1) + (1− β)u(yˆ(1, 1)) + βV1−Tˆc(1,1)
]
= q1
[−(1− β)y(0, 1) + βVTp(0,1) + (1− β)u(y(1, 0)) + βVTc(1,0)]
+q0
[−(1− β)y(0, 0) + βVTp(0,0) + (1− β)u(y(0, 0)) + βVTc(0,0)]
= [N − β(N − 2)]V0.
Suppose now that µ satisfies (7) and let (x, y′) ∈ X × Y . Since g(x) ∈ X, it
follows that
−(1− β)yˆ(x) + βVˆTˆp(x) = −(1− β)y(g(x)) + βVTp(g(x)) ≥
≥ −(1− β)y′Bc(g(x)) + βVTp(g(x),(y′,Bc(g(x)))) = −(1− β)y′Bˆc(x) + βVˆTˆp(x,(y′,Bˆc(x))).
This shows that µˆ satisfies (7).
Suppose next that µ satisfies (8) and let (x, α) ∈ X × {0, 1}. We then have that
(1− β)u(yˆ(x)) + βVˆTˆc(x) = (1− β)u(y(g(x))) + βVTc(g(x)) ≥
≥ (1− β)u(αBp(g(x))) + βVTc(g(x),(Bp(g(x)),α)) = (1− β)u(αBˆp(x)) + βVˆTˆc(x,(Bˆp(x),α)).
This shows that µˆ satisfies (8).
Next, suppose that µ satisfies (13). Let x ∈ X and a ̸= Bˆ(x). Then a ̸= B(g(x))
(since Bˆ(x) = B(g(x))) and, therefore, Tˆ (x, a) = g(T (g(x), a)) = g(g(x)) = x since
g = g−1. Hence, µˆ satisfies (13).
Finally, suppose that µ satisfies (14). Let x ∈ X be such that qˆx = 0. Then qg(x) =
0 and Bˆ(x) = B(g(x)). Therefore, Tˆ (x, Bˆ(x)) = g(T (g(x), B(g(x)))) = g(g(x)) = x
since g = g−1. Hence, µˆ satisfies (14). This completes the proof of the lemma.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
A road map of this proof is a follows. Recall that, for each x ∈ X, y(x) = Bp(x)Bc(x).
Claim 1 below shows that any state profile x at which y(x) > 0 is such that Tp(x) = 1,
Tp(x, (0, 1)) = 0 and −(1 − β)y(x) + βV1 ≥ βV0. In words, the producer needs to
be rewarded with a transition to the high status level in order to produce. Claim
2 below then shows that y(1, 1) = y(1, 0) = 0 because the producer already starts
with the high status and there are no transitions off the equilibrium path. Claim 3
states that y(0, 0) > 0 or y(0, 1) > 0 since µ is non-autarkic. Claim 4 then shows that
Tc(1, 1) = 1; indeed, if not, then the consumer could deviate and, because there are
no transitions off the equilibrium path, keep the high status. More surprising and less
intuitive is Claim 5 that shows that y(0, 0) = 0 or y(0, 1) = 0; its proof shows that
the only way to have both y(0, 0) > 0 and y(0, 1) > 0, and satisfy the equilibrium
conditions is to have q1 = 1; but this would mean that the norm is autarkic as
y(1, 1) = 0. Claim 6 then shows that q0 > 0 and that qs > 0 and u(y(0, s)) > y(0, s)
where s ∈ {0, 1} is such that y(0, s) > 0; this is so because µ is non-autarkic and recall
that, at this stage, we know that either y(0, 0) > 0 or y(0, 1) > 0 but not both. Claim
7 then shows it must, in fact, be y(0, 0) = 0 and y(0, 1) > 0 since, otherwise, status
0 would be the high status instead of status 1. At this stage, we have y(0, 1) > 0,
y(0, 0) = y(1, 0) = y(1, 1) = 0, Tp(0, 1) = 1, Tc(1, 1) = 1 and q0 ∈ (0, 1). To complete
the argument, we show that if µ is a non-autarkic equilibrium with V1 ≥ V0, then the
monetary trading norm with the same stationary distribution of the given equilibrium
and the same production at single-coincidence meetings with a status profile (0, 1) is
an equilibrium and yields the same average expected discounted utility as the given
equilibrium.
The details are as follows. Let µ = (pi, q) ∈ E be non-autarkic and such that
V1 ≥ V0. Lemma 2 implies that (7), (8) and (13) hold. We note that, from (5) and
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(6), it follows that
(V1 − V0)[(1− β)N + 2β] = (1− β)q0[y(0, 0)− y(1, 0) + u(y(0, 1))− u(y(0, 0))]
+ (1− β)q1[y(0, 1)− y(1, 1) + u(y(1, 1))− u(y(1, 0))]
+ βq0[VTp(1,0) − VTp(0,0) + VTc(0,1) − VTc(0,0)]
+ βq1[VTp(1,1) − VTp(0,1) + VTc(1,1) − VTc(1,0)].
(20)
We shall use (20) below.
From (7) we obtain that
Claim 1 Tp(x) = 1, Tp(x, (0, 1)) = 0 and −(1− β)y(x) + βV1 ≥ βV0 for each x ∈ X
such that y(x) > 0.
Indeed, let x ∈ X be such that y(x) > 0 and suppose that Tp(x) = 0. Since y(x) > 0,
Bc(x) = 1. From (7) with y
′ = 0, we obtain that
−(1− β)y(x) + βV0 ≥ βVTp(x,(0,1)) ≥ βV0,
i.e. y(x) ≤ 0, a contradiction. This shows that Tp(x) = 1. Another application of
(7), again with y′ = 0, gives −(1−β)y(x)+βV1 ≥ βVTp(x,(0,1)). Thus, Tp(x, (0, 1)) = 0
and −(1− β)y(x) + βV1 ≥ βV0.
It follows by Claim 1 that
Claim 2 y(1, s) = 0 for each s ∈ S.
Indeed, if for some s ∈ S we have that y(1, s) > 0, then Bc(1, s) = 1 and, by (13),
Tp((1, s), (0, 1)) = 1. But this contradicts Claim 1.
Since µ is non-autarkic, Claim 2 implies that
Claim 3 y(x) > 0 for some x ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1)}.
It follows by Claim 3 that
Claim 4 Tc(1, 1) = 1.
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Suppose not; then Tc(1, 1) = 0. By Claim 3, together with Claim 1, we obtain that
β(V1 − V0) > 0. Let α ̸= Bc(1, 1) and note that Tc((1, 1), (Bp(1, 1), α)) = 1 by (13)
and y(1, 1) = 0 by Claim 2. Thus,
(1− β)u(αBp(1, 1)) + βVTc((1,1),(Bp(1,1),α)) ≥ βV1 > βV0 = (1− β)u(y(1, 1)) + βVTc(1,1),
contradicting (8). Thus, it must be that Tc(1, 1) = 1.
Next we show that
Claim 5 y(x) = 0 for some x ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1)}.
Proof of Claim 5. Suppose that y(x) > 0 for all x ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1)}. Then
Claim 1 implies that
Tp(x) = 1 and − (1− β)y(x) + βV1 ≥ βV0 for all x ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1)}. (21)
We now consider two cases. The first case is when y(0, 0) = y(0, 1). In this case,
y(1, 1) = y(1, 0) = 0, y(0, 0) = y(0, 1) and Tp(0, 0) = Tp(0, 1) = 1, together with (20)
imply that
(V1 − V0)[(1− β)N + 2β] ≤ (1− β)y(0, 0) + β(V1 − V0)⇔ V1 − V0
1− β ≤
y(0, 0)
(1− β)N + β .
But then
β(V1 − V0)
1− β ≤
βy(0, 0)
(1− β)N + β < y(0, 0),
contradicting (21). This contradiction establishes Claim 5 in the case y(0, 0) = y(0, 1).
The second case is when y(0, 0) ̸= y(0, 1). In this case, let y, yˆ ∈ Y be such
that 0 < yˆ < y and {yˆ, y} = {y(0, 0), y(0, 1)}. Note that (21) implies that βV1 >
−(1− β)yˆ + βV1 > −(1− β)y + βV1 ≥ βV0.
We first argue that Tp(1, s) = 1 for each s ∈ S. Suppose not; then Tp(1, s) = 0
for some s ∈ S. If Bp(1, s) = 0, we then have that Tp((1, s), (yˆ, Bc(1, s))) = 1 by (13)
and, hence,
−(1−β)yˆBc(1, s)+βVTp((1,s),(yˆ,Bc(1,s))) ≥ −(1−β)yˆ+βV1 > βV0 = −(1−β)y(1, s)+βVTp(1,s).
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IfBp(1, s) > 0, we then have thatBc(1, s) = 0 by Claim 2 and Tp((1, s), (0, Bc(1, s))) =
1 by (13). Hence, letting y′ = 0,
−(1− β)y′Bc(1, s) + βVTp((1,s),(y′,Bc(1,s))) = βV1 > βV0 = −(1− β)y(1, s) + βVTp(1,s).
In either case, we obtain a contradiction to (7). Thus, it must be that Tp(1, s) = 1
for each s ∈ S.
In summary, for each s ∈ S, Tp(0, s) = 1 (by (21)), Tp(1, s) = 1 (by the
above) and Tc(1, 1) = 1 (by Claim 4). Thus,
∑
s:Tp(0,s)=0
qs = 0,
∑
s:Tc(s,0)=0
qs ≤ 1,∑
s:Tp(1,s)=0
qs = 0 and
∑
s:Tc(s,1)=0
qs ≤ q0. Then (1) implies that
2q0 ≤ q0 + (1− q0)q0 ⇔ q20 ≤ 0.
Thus, q0 = 0. This, together with y(1, 1) = 0 (by Claim 2), contradicts the fact that
µ is non-autarkic. This contradiction establishes Claim 5 in the case y(0, 0) ̸= y(0, 1).
Next we show that
Claim 6 q0 > 0 and, if s ∈ S is such that y(0, s) > 0, then qs > 0 and u(y(0, s)) >
y(0, s).
Indeed, it follows by Claims 2 and 5 that q0qs > 0 since µ is non-autarkic. Using
−(1− β)y(0, s) + βVTp(0,s) ≥ βV0 (which follows by Claim 1) and V1 ≥ V0 in (5), we
obtain that NV0 ≥ βNV0+qs(1−β)u(y(0, s)) > βNV0 and, hence, that V0 > 0. Thus,
W (µ) = q0V0 + q1V1 > 0, which together with (9) implies that u(y(0, s)) > y(0, s).
We then have that
Claim 7 y(0, 0) = 0 and y(0, 1) > 0.
Suppose not; then y(0, 0) > 0 and y(0, 1) = 0 by Claims 3 and 5. It follows by Claim
6 that q0 > 0 and u(y(0, 0)) > y(0, 0). From (20) we then have that
(V1 − V0)[(1− β)N + 2β] ≤ (1− β)q0(y(0, 0)− u(y(0, 0))) + 2β(V1 − V0)
⇔ N(V1 − V0) ≤ q0(y(0, 0)− u(y(0, 0))) < 0,
contradicting V1 ≥ V0. This contradiction establishes Claim 7.
It then follows by Claims 1, 6 and 7 that
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Claim 8 Tp(0, 1) = 1, q0 ∈ (0, 1) and y(0, 1) < u(y(0, 1)).
In summary, we have that y(0, 0) = y(1, 0) = y(1, 1) = 0, 0 < y(0, 1) < u(y(0, 1)),
Tp(0, 1) = 1, Tc(1, 1) = 1, q0 ∈ (0, 1) and
β
V1 − V0
1− β ≥ y(0, 1). (22)
Let piM be any monetary trading mechanism with BMp (0, 1) = y(0, 1) and µ
M =
(piM , q). We clearly have that µM ∈ M , yM(x) = y(x) for each x ∈ X and, by (9),
W (µM) = W (µ).
For convenience, let V ∗ = V (µM). To complete the proof of the proposition, we
will show, by considering several cases regarding the remaining values of T , that
β
V ∗1 − V ∗0
1− β ≥ y(0, 1). (23)
This inequality, together with Lemma 4, then establishes that (piM , q) ∈ E and com-
pletes the proof of the proposition.
Suppose that Tp(1, 0) = 0 or Tp(0, 0) = 1 or Tc(0, 1) = 0 or Tc(0, 0) = 1. We then
have by (20) that
(V1 − V0)[(1− β)N + 2β] = (1− β)[q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1y(0, 1)]
+βq0[VTp(1,0) − VTp(0,0) + VTc(0,1) − VTc(0,0)] + βq1[VTp(1,1) − V1 + V1 − VTc(1,0)] ≤
(1− β)[q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1y(0, 1)] + βq0[V1 − V0] + βq1[V1 − V0].
Thus, using (18),
V1 − V0
1− β ≤
q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1y(0, 1)
(1− β)N + β =
V ∗1 − V ∗0
1− β .
This inequality, together with (22), implies that (23) holds.
It follows by the above that we may assume that
Tp(1, 0) = Tc(0, 1) = 1 and Tp(0, 0) = Tc(0, 0) = 0. (24)
In other words, it remains to consider the possible cases regarding Tp(1, 1) and Tc(1, 0).
For (i, x) = (p, (1, 1)), (c, (1, 0)), let αi(x) ∈ {0, 1} be such that αi(x) = 1 if and only
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if Ti(x) = 0. We then have, by (1), 2q0 = q0[q0 + 0] + q0[q0 + (1− q0)αc(1, 0)] + (1−
q0)[0 + (1− q0)αp(1, 1)] + (1− q0)[0 + 0] and, hence,
2q0 = 2q
2
0 + q0(1− q0)αc(1, 0) + (1− q0)2αp(1, 1). (25)
Furthermore, by (20),
(V1 − V0)[(1− β)N + 2β] = (1− β)[q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1y(0, 1)]
+ 2βq0(V1 − V0) + βq1[VTp(1,1) − VTc(1,0)].
(26)
We consider the following four cases.
Case 1: Tc(1, 0) = 1 and Tp(1, 1) = 1. In this case, αc(1, 0) = 0 and αp(1, 1) = 0.
Then (25) is 2q0 = 2q
2
0 and, hence, q0 ∈ {0, 1}. But this contradicts q0 ∈ (0, 1) (see
Claim 8).
Case 2: Tc(1, 0) = 1 and Tp(1, 1) = 0. In this case, αc(1, 0) = 0 and αp(1, 1) = 1.
Then (25) is 2q0 = 2q
2
0 + 1 − 2q0 + q20 ⇔ 3q20 − 4q0 + 1 = 0. This, together with
q0 ∈ (0, 1) implies that q0 = 1/3 and q1 = 2/3. Also, (26) implies that
V1 − V0
1− β =
q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1y(0, 1)
(1− β)N + 2β(1− q0) + βq1 =
q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1y(0, 1)
(1− β)N + 2β <
V ∗1 − V ∗0
1− β .
This inequality, together with (22), implies that (23) holds.
Case 3: Tc(1, 0) = 0 and Tp(1, 1) = 1. In this case, αc(1, 0) = 1 and αp(1, 1) = 0.
Then (25) is 2q0 = 2q
2
0+q0−q20 and, hence, q0 ∈ {0, 1}. But this contradicts q0 ∈ (0, 1).
Case 4: Tc(1, 0) = 0 and Tp(1, 1) = 0. In this case, αc(1, 0) = 1 and αp(1, 1) = 1.
Then (25) is 2q0 = 2q
2
0 + q0 − q20 + 1− 2q0 + q20 ⇔ 2q20 − 3q0 + 1 = 0. This, together
with q0 ∈ (0, 1), implies that q0 = 1/2 = q1. Also, (26) implies that
V1 − V0
1− β =
q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1y(0, 1)
(1− β)N + 2β(1− q0) =
q0u(y(0, 1)) + q1
(1− β)N + β =
V ∗1 − V ∗0
1− β .
This equality, together with (22), implies that (23) holds.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 1
Let µ∗ = (B∗, T ∗, q∗) ∈ E be a non-autarkic optimal equilibrium. We first note that
we may assume that V1(µ
∗) ≥ V0(µ∗). Indeed, if V1(µ∗) < V0(µ∗), then µˆ such that
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µˆ ̸= µ∗ and µ∗Sµˆ is an optimal equilibrium with V1(µˆ) ≥ V0(µˆ). To see this, note that
by Lemma 6, we have that µˆ ∈ E, W (µˆ) = W (µ∗) and V1(µˆ) ≥ V0(µˆ). Moreover, µˆ is
a non-autarkic optimal equilibrium. Indeed, if not, then there exists µ¯ ∈ E such that
µ¯ ≻ µˆ. Letting µ′ such that µ′ ̸= µ¯ and µ¯Sµ′, we then have that µ′ ∈ E by Lemma
6 and µ′ ≻ µ∗ by (16). But this contradicts the assumption that µ∗ is an optimal
equilibrium. This contradiction shows that µˆ is an optimal equilibrium.
It then follows by Proposition 1 and Claim 8 that y∗(0, 0) = y∗(1, 0) = y∗(1, 1) = 0,
0 < y∗(0, 1) < u(y∗(0, 1)), T ∗p (0, 1) = 1 and q
∗
0 ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, since y∗(0, 1) >
0, we have that B∗p(0, 1) = y
∗(0, 1) and B∗c (0, 1) = 1.
We next show that
Claim 9 T ∗(0, 1) = (1, 0) and T ∗(x, a) = x for all (x, a) ̸= ((0, 1), B∗(0, 1)).
Proof of Claim 9. We have that T ∗(x, a) = x for all x ∈ X and a ̸= B∗(x) by
(13). Moreover, T ∗p (0, 1) = 1 by the above.
Suppose that T ∗(x) = x for all x ̸= (0, 1) and T ∗c (0, 1) = 1. It then follows by (1)
that 2q∗0 = (q
∗
0)
2 + q∗0 ⇔ q∗0 ∈ {0, 1}. But this contradicts q∗0 ∈ (0, 1). Hence,
T ∗(x) ̸= x for some x ̸= (0, 1) or T ∗c (0, 1) = 0. (27)
Suppose that there exists x′ ̸= (0, 1) such that T ∗(x′) ̸= x′. Let, by Propo-
sition 1, µM = (piM , q∗) ∈ M ∩ E be such that W (µM) = W (µ∗). We have
that BM(0, 1) = (y∗(0, 1), 1) = B∗(0, 1) and that C(µM) = {((0, 1), B∗(0, 1))} ⊂
{((0, 1), B∗(0, 1)), (x′, B∗(x′))} ⊆ C(µ∗). Thus, c(µM) < c(µ∗) by the second part of
Lemma 1 and, thus, µM ≻ µ∗ by (15). But this contradicts the optimality of µ∗. This
contradiction shows that T ∗(x) = x for all x ̸= (0, 1). It then follows by (27) that
T ∗c (0, 1) = 0. Hence, the claim follows.
To complete the proof of the corollary, it remains to show that B∗p(x) = 0 for each
x ̸= (0, 1). Suppose not; then B∗p(x) > 0 for some x ̸= (0, 1). Since y∗(x) = 0, we
have that B∗c (x) = 0. Letting α = 1, and using T
∗(x) = x = T ∗(x, (B∗p(x), α)) (which
follows by Claim 9), we have that
(1−β)u(y∗(x))+βVT ∗c (x) = βVxc < (1−β)u(B∗p(x))+βVxc = (1−β)u(αB∗p(x))+βVT ∗c (x,(B∗p(x),α)).
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This contradiction to (8) shows that B∗p(x) = 0 for each x ̸= (0, 1) and completes the
proof of the corollary.
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